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INTRODUCTION 
Servant of God, well done, well hast thou fought 
The Better fight, who singly hast maintained 
Against revolted multitudes the cause 
Of truth, in word mightier than they in arms. 
John Milton 
Introduction 
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In the era of mass communication, the British Broadcasting Corporation retains an 
association with notions of truth, objectivity and acute news analysis. It is said that during 
periods of conflict or crisis, when the susceptibility to exaggeration often marks 'official' 
news content, those individuals caught up in the events, the educated and illiterate alike 
often ask one another, 'What did the BBC say?' 
1 For nearly three-quarters of the 
twentieth century, the BBC has provided news and information, variety and entertainment 
to both a British and an international audience. It is and has always been a peculiarly 
British institution, one which was not afraid to engage in 'democratic broadcasting' during 
the Second World War even at the risk of disrupting home morale, but also one which 
consistently struggled with its semi-independent identity . 
Between 1933 and 1938, Nazi Germany engaged in the systematic persecution of 
its Jewish community with acts of increasing intensity. One would, therefore, expect the 
BBC to have reported extensively on these developments considering its association with 
hard-nosed journalism and critical news broadcasting. That this was not the case is in part 
explicable through the extent to which Broadcasting House, in direct and independent 
compliance with the diplomatic aims of the Foreign Office, was party to and a partner in 
the application of the policy of appeasement. There was a major discrepancy between the 
BBC's knowledge of what was happening in Nazi Germany and the Corporation's effort 
to disseminate that knowledge to any great extent. 'Negative' news about Nazi Germany 
was carefully controlled by the BBC during this period in order to ensure that 'sensitive' 
information was not widely distributed for public consumption. This is, however, only a 
partial explanation. British social and cultural attitudes towards Jews contributed to an 
environment in which fuller and more detailed information or comment about the anti-
Jewish persecution was not broadcast because it was not a priority to do so. These were 
not only implicitly exemplified and reinforced by the broadcasting policy of the BBC, but 
must be seen as the principle reason for the misinterpretation and misrepresentation of the 
realities of the events of the 1930s. News of anti-Jewish persecution was never 
considered a broadcast priority by the BBC and the issue of its dissemination was never a 
source of contention between the BBC and the Foreign Office. Appeasement may have 
1 Julian Hale, Radio Power (London, 1975), 48 
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restricted the BBC's broadcasting boundaries, but it was the socio-cultural phenomenon 
of latent British anti-Semitism, inherent in the Corporation itself, which unconsciously 
regulated news output during this period . 
A brief chronological survey of 'major' and widely-publicized events (in the 
popular press and elsewhere) in Nazi Germany compared to its broadcast coverage on the 
BBC gives an indication of the editorial policy that largely ignored some fundamental 
features of the Nazi regime. From 1933 to 1938, there were at least forty stories dealing 
generally with Jews or Jewish issues either related or not to Nazi Germany. Among the 
more prominent events in pre-war Nazi Germany were the April 1 boycott of Jewish 
businesses in 1933, the Nuremberg laws of 15 September 1935 disenfranchising Jews, and 
the events of Kristallnacht on 9 November 1938. Out of these, the April boycott was 
discussed in two non-news bulletins but the tone of the discussion preferred to minimize 
the extent of the boycott. 2 The Nuremberg decrees were mentioned in one, brief news 
bulletin lasting no more than twenty seconds and devoted primarily to the Memel dispute. 
3 Kristallnacht was also mentioned in a news bulletin, without commentary and with few 
details. The report, surprisingly, provided far more detail than many other reports dealing 
with anti-Jewish persecution: 
After the death of Herr vom Rath, the Secretary of the German Embassy in Paris, 
who was shot by a Polish Jew, a national campaign of anti-Jewish rioting and 
arson began throughout Germany on November 10. Nine out of eleven synagogues 
in Berlin were set on fire, and synagogues were destroyed in many other parts of 
the country. Shop windows throughout Germany were smashed and goods 
· destroyed or looted, and many shops and restaurants were also set on fire [ ... ] all 
damage done during the attacks on Jewish property would be made good by the 
Jews themselves, and that from the beginning of next year no Jews would be 
allowed to engage in retail trades, export, business, commercial affairs or 
independent handicraft businesses or to act as managers.4 
As we shall see, a pattern of incomplete and misleading news regarding anti-Jewish 
persecution and presented by the BBC developed from the outset of the Nazi rise to 
power . 
2 for more on this report, see below pp. 72-73 
3 for more on this report, see below pp. 67-68 
4 BBC Scripts in the Listener (hereafter BBC Scripts), News Bulletin: 'Anti-Jewish rioting in Germany', · 
10 November 1938 
3 
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I. Presenting a case 
The story of how the BBC disseminated information about the condition of Jews in 
Germany during the prewar 1930s overlaps with the story of the Corporation's 
relationship with the Foreign Office and its reflection of wider British social values . 
Through a cooperative relationship forged between itself and the Foreign Office, the BBC 
may be seen as tacit partner in helping the state implement a policy of appeasement 
towards Germany. This relationship affected the way in which the BBC handled German 
news and, by extension, information about anti-Jewish persecution in Germany. News 
deemed 'negative', defined as such by the Foreign Office and eventually self-regulated by 
the BBC, was to be avoided after 1936. What is astonishing, however, was just how little 
information about anti-Jewish persecution was dispensed for broadcast before this time -
three years after the introduction of anti-Semitism as official policy in Germany. Even 
fewer reports about anti-Jewish persecution would be broadcast after 1936. Why, then, 
was one of the defining features of pre-war Nazi Germany left largely ignored and 
critically neglected? Why was this issue never a broadcast priority? The evidence 
suggests that social and cultural perceptions towards Jews, which amounted to a latent 
anti-Semitism in Britain, is a partial explanation. Sympathy toward persecuted Jews 
neither resonated among the British public nor its 'great interpreter' : the British 
Broadcasting Corporation. Both halves of the subsequent discussion pursue these 
independent, but interrelated issues. In the interest of clarity, sub-sections are arranged 
largely thematically and where practical, the issues are developed chronologically. Part 
one provides the contextual background necessary to understand the factors considered in 
the second half Furthermore, any attempt to define the BBC's role in a 'conspiracy of 
ambivalence' requires a specific examination of the part played by the Foreign Office. 
Part one deals with the BBC's indirect role in promoting the state's policy of 
appeasement. It is concerned with the Corporation's relationship with the Foreign Office 
and particularly, the Foreign Press Office (FPO). It traces the BBC's unofficial 
involvement in helping to mitigate increasing diplomatic instability between Great Britain 
and her neighbors, particularly Germany. This unofficial role found the Corporation 
4 
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conforming to 'the general line' disseminated by the Foreign Office news department 
which resulted in tacitly approved, self-imposed censorship. 
5 By 1934, all manuscripts for 
broadcast were approved by the Foreign Office in an agreement forged between Foreign 
Office representatives and BBC Director-General John Reith, before their radio 
transmission. It is also an examination of the extent to which the Foreign Office saw itself 
as the ultimate arbiter over Corporation decisions and the increasingly blurred line 
between BBC independence and official sanction. In an unstable and contradictory 
fashion, the Foreign Office sometimes complained about the BBC's left-wing bias and at 
others, protested against what it regarded as the Corporation' s ' pro-Nazi' sentiments. By 
1936, the Foreign Office would seek to minimize broadcasts which portrayed Nazi 
Germany in a negative light. Although the Corporation cooperated with the Foreign 
Office, their relationship did not emerge as a result of pressure or coercion. The BBC was 
a willing partner of the Foreign Office. 
6 
Part one also looks at the BBC's unofficial diplomatic role including. instances 
when the Corporation formally apologized to foreign governments for 'offensive' 
broadcasts. Here we shall see how the BBC maintained formal relations with foreign 
governments and their agencies, particularly, the Nazi Reichs Rund.Funk Gesselschaft . 
The relationship between these two agencies encouraged, in part, BBC broadcasts 
designed to promote 'mutual understanding' between Britain and Germany. But, while 
the Corporation went to great lengths to portray positive features found within the 'new 
Germany' it also permitted broadcasts which were critical of Germany's less palpable 
features, such as its militaristic outlook and its concerted policy of rearmament. When it 
came to the anti-Jewish persecution (discussed in part two), the BBC scrupulously 
followed an absolute line of 'objectivity' apparently believing that the only 'objective' way 
to relate this information was to grant equal weight to both 'sides' . This pinpoints the 
BBC's approach to news dissemination and objectivity overall; that all views were 
legitimate and had a right to be argued in an arena of ideas. But this belief did not seem to 
5 Bryan Haworth, 'The British Broadcasting Corporation, Nazi Germany and the Foreign Office: 1933-
1936', Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, volume I, number I (March 1981), 53 
6 A historiographical survey on the existing literature in relation to the BBC and the Foreign Office is 
discussed in part one, see below pp. 24-25 
5 
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cut across all lines of political and religious viewpoints. The fear of communism and 
Reith's belief that broadcasting 'should not be allowed to assist the process of 
secularization', provided non-Christians, leftists and others with comparatively few 
opportunities to engage the microphone. 
7 Part one aims to define the framework with in 
which the BBC operated. The pursuit of appeasement increasingly determined the content 
of news broadcasts concerning Germany. A belief in the promotion of mutual 
understanding, shared by the BBC and the Foreign Office, created an environment within 
which it was held that negative broadcasting about Nazi Germany would only exacerbate 
diplomatic tension . 
Part two attempts to show that a policy that amounted to 'appeasement 
broadcasting' had only an indirect impact on information relating to the anti-Jewish crisis . 
In fact, there is no evidence to show that the desire to broadcast fuller accounts of 
persecution ever emerged. There was no conspiracy within the halls of Broadcasting 
House to keep information about the Jewish condition muted but there seemed to be 
higher broadcast priorities. In any case, the Corporation saw anti-Jewish persecution as 
secondary to other forms of Nazi repression, most notably, anti-Church persecution. The 
Jewish community, moreover, was seen as a racial minority but regarded as a well-
organized political force with one broadcaster observing how the Jews 'have always been 
self-contained' . 8 When information about anti-Jewish repression reached the airwaves, 
the tone of the broadcast almost always implied that Jews, along with Marxists and Social 
Democrats, constituted a political opposition. Jews, it seemed, could 'escape' persecution 
themselves by a reversal of their ideological affiliation as might Marxists and Social 
Democrats too. The myth of race also contributed to the frequent stereotypical portrayals 
of heavily accented 'East End' Jews in BBC broadcast comedy sketches and associations 
which linked Jews with exaggerated cultural and physical features. 
9 All this did not pass 
unnoticed by Anglo-Jewish representatives. The Anglo-Jewish community and the efforts 
7 Ian McIntyre, The Expense of Glory: A Life of John Reith (London, 1993), 188. quoting Reith to a 
committee on wireless in 1927. 
8 BBC Scripts, Lord Baldwin, ' A World's Good Cause: An Appeal for Jews and non-Aryan Christians ', 8 
December 1938 
9 see below pp. 86-87 
6 
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made on its behalf by the Board of Deputies of British Jews established an informal 
relationship with the BBC in order to monitor broadcasts relating to Jewish affairs . 
In the climate of 1930s Britain, perhaps it is not surprising to discover that the 
BBC applied a distorted conception of race to individuals that was usually linked to their 
nationality or religion (i.e. 'German race', 'Jewish race'). But what is surprising was the 
extent to which the Corporation 'spiritually surrendered' to Nazi conceptions of race by 
adopting some of the language of German racialism. When describing 'non-Aryans' 
broadcasters failed to differentiate Germany's mythological belief in an 'Aryan' race and, 
perhaps, their own. So instead of discussing persecution against those 'Germany saw as 
non-Aryans', the BBC would describe the suffering of 'non-Aryans'. Broadcasts also 
often implied that Jews were partially responsible for the increase in anti-Semitic 
persecution. The German-Jewish condition was discussed frequently alongside reports 
about monopolistic corporations and powerful and exploitative banks run by Jews. The 
implication, of course, was that Jewish behavior helped to contribute to a renewed 
atmosphere of anti-Semitism, a belief in what historian Tony Kushner describes as 'well-
earned anti-Semitism'. 1
0 This line of reasoning also helped the BBC to justify its 
moderated treatment of Jewish-related news whether it had to do with Nazi Germany or 
not. The belief went that if the BBC broadcast too much information about the Jews, it 
could only exacerbate anti-Semitism at home . 
In order to contextualize properly the cultural milieu in which the BBC operated, 
part two opens with a general survey examining the social anti-Semitism of British society 
in the 1930s. If the history of British anti-Semitism - both political and violent - has been 
well-documented, the study of social anti-:Semitism has been largely neglected. 
11 
Traditional notions of anti-Semitism have been associated with violence and terror and the 
conscious hatred of individuals. By the 1930s, this overt or 'conscious' anti-Semitism no 
longer remained socially acceptable and those who spouted the language of late 
nineteenth-century anti-Semitism were marginalized. A more unconscious anti-Semitism, 
10 Tony Kushner, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination: A Social and Cultural History (Oxford, 
1994), 40 
11 see Gisela Lebzelter, Political Anti-Semitism in England 1918-1939 (London, 1978). Also see Colin 
Holmes, Anti-Semitism in British Society 1876-1939 (New York, 1979) 
7 
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however, replaced its predecessor and defined the common attitudes toward Jews held 
among a large segment of British society. It was a much more abstract form of bigotry, a 
combination of ignorance and ambivalence and a hyperbolized belief in the power of the 
Jewish community. It was not the radical anti-Semitism of the British Union of Fascists or 
the Britons, but an 'unconscious' anti-Semitism reflected throughout many levels of 
society. It was an attitude which linked Jews, refugees and Communists so that they 
would become virtually synonymous. Martin Gilbert writes that anti-Semitism was a 
common feature of British thought 'not confined to any particular class, which was 
widespread enough to blunt the edge of criticism against Hitler's racial policies. Nor did 
one have necessarily to be an anti-Semite in order to avoid being horrified by Nazi policy 
towards the Jews.' 12 
Tony Kushner describes widespread social anti-Semitism as the limit of tolerance 
in a liberal society. Common sentiments held toward Jews by individuals within British 
society enabled people to hold a 'bifurcated' perspective in relation to their attitude 
toward Jews. 13 A distinction could thus be drawn between 'good' Jews and 'bad' ones . 
This social perception enabled individuals to attempt to understand the measures taken 
against the German-Jewish community, but not necessarily to agree with the severity of 
them. The activities of the BBC in the 1930s exemplified the argument presented in 
Kushner's revisionist study of British ' social anti-Semitism' . 
IT. BBC history and studies of broadcasting and the Holocaust 
During its first decade of mass broadcasting, the BBC was occupied with the 
natural administrative glitches and organizational affairs of any new corporation. The 
1930s was to see news, talks, sports, entertainment and variety eventually falling under 
separate administrative control. International short-wave transmissions and Empire 
broadcasts, at the same time, were technologically perfected by the end of the decade . 
12 Martin Gilbert, The Roots of Appeasement (London, 1966), 162 
13 Kushner, p. 36 
8 
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Most importantly during this period, however, was the BBC's struggle to carve out an 
independent identity or at the very least, give the appearance of functioning as a totally 
autonomous entity, free from the editorial reins of the state. The line between the BBC's 
independence and its complicity with the wishes of the Foreign Office had, throughout the 
1930s, become blurred . 
Several historians have chronicled the formative years of the BBC and some have 
discussed this very issue. Asa Briggs has written the definitive history of the BBC 
discussing its development and its emergence as a powerful British institution. 
14 Paddy 
Scannell and David Cardiff have written an exhaustive account of the BBC's early social 
history which deals briefly with the Corporation' s relationship to the Foreign Office. 
15 
Unlike Scannell and Cardiff, Briggs' account largely ignores the relationship between the 
Foreign Office and the BBC. 
16 One writer, referring to Briggs' third volume on the 
wartime BBC, has argued rightly that Briggs' history, by neglecting to address fully the 
question of self-imposed censorship, largely exonerates the BBC from these charges. 
17 
Although it is virtually impossible to engage in any discussion of the BBC without 
consulting Briggs, there are enough gaps in his account that merit greater examination . 
Other historians have looked at the BBC's role during the Second World War and 
its impact upon occupied Europe. Jean Seaton wrote an important account of the BBC's 
broadcast coverage of what came to be known as the Holocaust and Gabriel Milland is 
currently finishing a doctoral dissertation on the same subject. 
18 Both of these historians 
share one similar conclusion: the BBC had more information than they dispensed for 
public consumption but the material broadcast was not totally insignificant. Seaton writes: 
Within the BBC any prominent official could have known about the Nazi plans 
and actions against the Jews from information that was regularly circulated within 
the organization. Indeed, so could any member of the public. They were told as 
much as readers of the Jewish Chronicle . Public opinion was not aroused more 
14 see Asa Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom (5 vols., Oxford, 1965) 
15 Paddy Scannell and David Cardif( A Social History of British Broadcasting. Volume I: Serving the 
Nation (Oxford, 1991) 
16 Scannell and Cardiff and Briggs are more fully developed in an historiographical survey, see below pp . 
24-25 
17 Gabriel Milland, ' A very British kind of censorship: The BBC and the Holocaust' (unpublished essay 
given at the IHR on 31 October 1996), 1 
18 see Jean Seaton, 'The BBC and the Holocaust', European Journal of Communication, volume II (1987). · 
Gabriel Milland is currently finishing his doctoral dissertation at the University of Leicester. 
9 
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because 'doing' something about it seemed impossible, and it was a low priority 
on the political agenda. 19 
Seaton also explains that the popular idea of the 'Jew', described by Kushner, which was 
deeply ingrained into the British consciousness, was also reflected on the walls of 
Broadcasting House. 20 'The BBC displayed,' writes Seaton 'both before and during the 
war, views and decisions that were quite simply anti-Semitic.' 
21 Seaton's account, like 
this one, is concerned with the information that was available and how it was presented . 
She acknowledges that there were very few instances during the War when information 
about death camps was suppressed. It simply did not feature high on the priority list of 
BBC broadcasting. 22 This dissertation, then, is designed, in part, to give greater context 
to the issues raised in these examinations of the BBC and the Holocaust. Although this 
study ends with the year 193 8 and therefore does not deal with the Corporation's 
broadcast coverage of mass murder, it is crucial in understanding the way in which the 
BBC went about dealing with pre-war anti-Jewish persecution in order to grasp how it 
dealt with the information about wartime atrocities. This will be developed further in the 
conclusion . 
Any examination into the dissemination of information during the Holocaust falls 
broadly under the discipline of Holocaust and Genocide Studies. More recently, the sub-
discipline of 'Bystander studies' has come to encompass the study of individuals and 
institutions which had knowledge of pre-war persecution and wartime mass murder but 
either failed to act or were unable to do anything. The time period covered in this 
discussion predates what is commonly called the Holocaust. My intention is to add 
another dimension to this sub-discipline. t The following two sections outline the 
contextual background necessary to understand the impact and significance of radio 
during the 1930s . 
19 Seaton, pp. 75-76 
20 Kushner, p. 36 He writes about the deeply ingrained view of ' the Jew' . 
21 Seaton, p. 66 
22 Seaton, p. 69. She writes: 'Anti-Semitism was not taken seriously and seen almost as a historical 
anachronism in a modern world[ ... ] This confident dismissal of anti-Semitism was an unspoken 
assumption which undoubtedly acted as an impediment to counter attack. ' 
t Many historians have described the period beginning in 194 l and ending in 1945 as the Holocaust 
period. More recently, historians have included the years 1933-1941 as part of the Holocaust period . 
10 
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Ill. Radio and the press 
It is not surprising that the BBC played a significant role in the early development 
of wireless broadcasting. When the British Broadcasting Company became incorporated 
in 1927, Sir John Reith (later Lord), the BBC's first director-general recognized radio's 
potential for disseminating information, a potential more powerful than the printed press 
and one which could standardize the way information was received by the public . 
'Broadcasting is a huge agency of standardisation,' concurred Hilda Matheson, the 
Corporation's first director of talks, in 1933, 'the most powerful the world has ever seen.' 
23 Marconi's wireless invention was to revolutionize the spread of information and in turn, 
increase the international influence of the media. When radio emerged as a significant 
medium in the 1930s, the BBC was one of a handful of successful and important broadcast 
outfits in the world. Reith's BBC was a world-leader in the technological development of 
mass communication. But what differentiated the BBC from its international counterparts 
was its strictly non-commercial nature and the expression it gave to 'democratic 
enlightenment' . 24 The British government recognized too, the disseminatory potential of 
radio, and actively encouraged its development by helping to make it a publicly-funded 
institution. Annual license fees not only enabled the Corporation to function without too 
many financial difficulties but also helped to define the true 'democratic' nature of the 
BBC - an institution which would have to remain accountable to the public who 
contributed the funds, and to the state which facilitated the distribution of these funds . 
In 1929 over two million British households paid a radio license fee and this figure 
grew by twenty percent per annum throughout the 1930s. By 1938, nearly nine million 
British households paid a license fee for radio or 71.4 families out of every 100.
25 It is, 
however, impossible to measure the real social impact of radio using statistics alone: 
'Radio in the living room had become, by the end of the thirties, part of the furniture of 
23 Asa Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, volume II: The Golden Age of 
Wireless (Oxford, 1965), ix 
24 Scannell and Cardiff, p. 13 
25 Asa Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, volume III: The War of Words 
(London, 1970), Appendix B. These statistics are also found in the British Broadcasting Corporation 
Handbook (London, i940), 106 
11 
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everyday domestic existence.' 
26 These figures are significant and indicate the rapid 
growth of radio during the 1930s. But the real impact of radio can be measured by the 
meteoric rise of the BBC as a British institution, 'as British as the Bank of England'. 
27 
The concept of objectivity was to be a hallmark of news broadcasting from its very 
inception. Unlike the press, 'British broadcast news service, is the ally of responsible 
journalism everywhere' said Sir Stephen Tallents, BBC controller of public relations, in 
193 7. 'A newspaper with a private axe to grind cannot now invent or suppress news so 
easily as it could before wireless came.' 
28 The publicly-owned BBC was a service 
designed for the public who funded it and one which ideally had to appeal to every social 
element by holding fast to the idea of objectivity. British newspapers often interpreted 
news in a politically-biased fashion, the result of which was a disparity in the way 
information was received along geographical and social lines. The intention of radio was 
to change that. 29 By the 1930s, the BBC began to rival print media in its power to 
disseminate information to a broad audience. There were important differences, however, 
between broadcast and print media and their separate interpretations of similar news 
events. While 'dailies' in different regions went about presenting similar information in 
dissimilar ways, the BBC, by contrast, presented news in a standardized format. Listeners 
in Edinburgh, thus, heard the same broadcast as listeners in Brighton. Radio, through a 
single and consistent interpretation of news events, had a centralizing effect on the 
collective consciousness of Britons . 
Andrew Sharf argues that, on the whole, the British press failed to develop the 
idea that anti-Semitism was a fundamental feature of Nazi Germany. 
30 There was no 
attempt, until 1935, to show that anti-Semitism was endemic to Nazi Germany or that it 
was an official policy. Sharf also shows how anti-Jewish persecution was often presented 
as the marginal actions of peripheral German figures. Another conclusion he develops 
26 Scannell and Cardiff, p. 14 
27 Briggs, vol. II, p. 11 
28 Sian Nicholas, 'Radio and the Popular Press: 1922-1945' (unpublished essay given at the ICBH 
Conference of9-10 September 1996), 14 
29 Briggs, volume II, p. 8. He writes: ' Given the wide social and geographical divisions in Britain, it [the 
wireless] had a limited if useful role as the interpreter of one part of "the great audience" to another.' 
30 Andrew Sharf, The British Press and the Jews under Nazi Rule (Oxford, 1964 ), 40 
12 
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points to the general emphasis, in the press, placed on the prominence of Jews in Nazi 
Germany. He writes: 'It was hard for British journalists and political commentators to 
understand that the Jews were not being persecuted for alleged crimes or "anti-social" 
practices[ ... ] but precisely because of their positive achievements in commerce, industry, 
and the professions.' 31 Sharf also shows how much of the popular press consistently 
reiterated its 'neutrality' on the subject of anti-Jewish persecution. 
32 The anti-Jewish 
crisis was often presented as a result of long-standing differences between Nazis and Jews 
and implied that there were 'sides' to be taken. In one example, he discusses a story 
reported in the Daily Express on a press conference given by Prussian Prime Minister 
Hermann Goering. The report also featured coverage of an anti-Nazi protest meeting held 
by the Board of Deputies of British Jews. One half of the page featured a photograph of 
Goering under the title 'the Accusation', the other half showed a photograph of the Board 
meeting under the title 'the Denial'. 33 Often, Sharf writes, the popular press focused on a 
'startling' event but never made an attempt to develop a methodical compilation of anti-
Jewish persecution. 34 Everything else, suggests Sharf s evidence, was a non event. 
Sharfs study, however, differs from this discussion in one very distinct way . 
Unlike the 'standardized' format of the BBC, there was a discrepancy in the way this news 
was handled from one daily to the next. Anti-Jewish persecution was, on the whole, 
covered prominently in the Manchester Guardian throughout the 1930s, while The Times 
and the Telegraph initially stressed anti-Communist persecution, often implying its 
justification. 35 With the exception of the Guardian, on balance the press underestimated 
the severity and implications of persecution. In addition, many newspapers, like the Daily 
Express, featured anti-Jewish persecution prominently in 1933 because, as Sharf observes, 
there was 'good news value in the Jewish question.' 36
 As other newspapers began to 
31 ibid. 
32 The Daily Express of 25 March 1934 wrote that it was 'neither pro-Jewish nor pro-Nazi, anti-Jewish 
nor anti-Nazi'. ibid. , 15 
33 ibid., 16 
34 ibid., 73 
35 Andrew Sharf, 'The British Press and the Holocaust', Yad Vashem Studies, volume V (Jerusalem, 
1963), 169-192. He writes: 'The disparity of approach [to the anti-Jewish persecution] was so wide that it 
was hard to believe the same event was being discussed at all. ' 
36 Sharf, The British Press and Jews under Nazi Rule, p. 14 
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discuss the situation more fully, the Daily Express moderated its own coverage because it 
no longer ensured the paper's increasing circulation. In light of Sharf s work, it is 
surprising that virtually nothing has been written about the BBC and its approach to the 
so-called 'Jewish question' during the interwar Nazi period. Given the remit within which 
it saw itself as being 'duty bound' to operate, the BBC's ambivalence toward the crisis is a 
dysfunction which has been strangely ignored by social historians. 
The BBC was designed to carry out an important primary task in relation to news . 
That task was to tell the truth, make it accessible to a wide audience, and deliver the 
information in the absence of morally subjective criticism. Reith's BBC was to be the 
standard-bearer of truth and objectivity. The director-general's Corporation embarked on 
a moral crusade whose ultimate truth was to be found in unbiased, unpropagated 
information. The 1935 BBC Annual stated: 'Broadcasting has an opportunity and 
responsibility which no newspaper can ever have. It is impossible to exaggerate the value 
to the nation and the world of an unbiased, accurate, and balanced presentation, day by 
day, of the significant news. That is the ideal which the B.B. C. has before it.' 
37 The limit 
to this idealism, however, especially in relation to broadcasting the anti-Jewish 
persecution, was a moral relativism derived from the absolute belief that there were always 
two 'sides' to every story. The interwar years, in addition, was a period during which the 
exchange of information and its dissemination was relatively free. Between 1933 and 
1939, information on Nazi policy with regard to the Jewish population in Germany was 
widely available to the media, the Foreign Office and even tourists. 
38 Indeed the issue of 
anti-Jewish persecution could be described as salient in pre-war Nazi Germany. Those · 
37 BBC Annual 1935 (London, 1935), 61 
38 Kushner, p. 23. He writes: 'There was[ ... ] a greater synchronism between Nazi policies and knowledge 
of them outside Germany in the period from 1933-1939 than at any other stage of the Holocaust. 
Nevertheless, the manner in which news concerning anti-Jewish legislation, expulsions and violence 
became assimilated in free world countries was, despite the clarity of information available, still 
complicated, reflecting the importance of domestic ideologies.' Andrew Sharf writes: ' With certain 
exceptions, the Nazis made no attempt whatever to conceal what was going on[ ... ] During the whole six 
years of peace [1933-1939] every one of those regulations (beginning with that applying to the German 
Bar, a restriction unprecedented in modem Europe) was published and circulated through perfectly 
ordinary channels. The world was officially informed and left to draw what conclusions it could, and, 
while the authorities angrily denied the truth of particular incidents in their street campaign, they did not 
deny the campaign itselfor try to hide the main lines of its development[ ... ] freedom of movement for the · 
foreign press and opportunity to gather news were [ ... ] almost entirely unrestricted.', pp. 7-8 . 
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who broadcast information about these policies were almost always individuals well-
versed in German policy and culture, people who had spent time in Germany and who 
were sensitive to events as they unfolded. 
39 But the way in which this information was 
broadcast was invariably superficial. 
IV. News and the Talks Department 
In 1933 radio was still a fairly new medium and one which would expose both the 
reading and non-reading public alike to new forms of information. 'We really believed 
that broadcasting could revolutionize human opinion,' wrote Lionel Fielden, a Talks 
department executive. 40 The pioneers at Broadcasting House, whether taking part in 
music production or selecting speakers for topical talks, set the tone for British 
broadcasting in the 1930s. It was an exciting time to be taking part in an information 
revolution which combined technology and creativity. Those who established the 
technological and editorial infrastructure of the BBC were, literally, at the center of this 
revolution. Sophisticated machinery had to be developed rapidly in order to broadcast 
from remote locations. Talented minds had to develop abstract techniques which could 
enable listeners to combine the sound with a vivid mental imagery . 
39 Broadcasters discussing Germany were often individuals who had close con~ections with senior 
German officials. When considering whether to use Sefton Delmer of the Daily Express as a broadcaster 
on German affairs, one memorandum in support of his appointment noted: 'Delmer is[ ... ] bi-lingual and 
a close friend of Hitler and the Nazi movement. He is, however, fairly independent.' British Broadcasting 
Corporation Written Archive Center, Caversham Park (hereafter BBC WAC) R5 l/582 talks from abroad, 
memorandum on Delmer, 4 April 1933. 
Another BBC broadcaster, Sir Evelyn Wrench, in a letter to his producer, noted how he had 
asked whether Dr. Goebbels, 'would like to give me a message for British listeners?' He went on to write: 
'My friend, Dr. Goebbels, the German Minister of Propaganda, is as you know, a great wireless fan.' 
BBC WAC Sir Evelyn Wrench file I, 1932-34, Wrench to talks assistant Lionel Fielden, 12 April 1933 
In addition, many of the broadcasters were familiar with Nazi policy and had read Mein Kampf 
One broadcaster called it 'a strange mixture of commonsense, wild theory, and dangerous false doctrine.' 
BBC Scripts, S.K. Ratcliffe, 'My Glimpse of the New Germany', 31 July 1933 
40 Briggs, vol. II, p. 13. quoting Lionel Fielden on the birth of broadcasting . 
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Under Hilda Matheson, news features and topical talks took on a bold tone and a 
critical perspective in these earliest broadcasts. t The era often referred to as the 'golden 
age' of the Talks department was one which also inaugurated the decade of political 
stratification, of direct confrontation between Fascism and Communism. 
41 Political crisis 
and revolutionary upheaval, . thus, marked the period under which Matheson, and later 
Charles Siepmann and Richard Maconachie, processed news and made it accessible to the 
listening public. The age of Matheson lasted until 193 2, Siepmann lasted until 193 5 and 
their respective tenures formed the most 'radical' period of the Talks department. t It was 
only with Maconachie's arrival that the substance and style of news content was altered by 
the removal of critical news analysis and the adoption of closer ties with Foreign Office 
policy. 42 The Talks department was not a monolithic one in terms of individual political 
outlooks. Until 1935, the airwaves were filled with contrasting views and differing 
interests but dominated by a liberal-minded ideology whose laissez-faire approach 
towards the exchange of information promoted the marketplace of ideas, in the face of 
politically slanted press publications. 43 Most broadcasters in the department shared the 
Matheson-Siepmann approach to broadcasting, even if they held divergent interpretations 
of news events. This era was far more experimental than subsequent ones which, as we 
shall see, inspired a total retreat from controversy by 1938. 
44 
News bulletins and news features were two separate forms of dissemination in both 
content and editorial control. Throughout the 1930s, BBC news bulletins were simply re-
written wire accounts provided by Reuters. The only opportunity for the News 
department to compose and produce its own broadcasts was through features and talks . 
These regular features, which might deal with contemporary world affairs or the political 
climate in Britain, were usually written and delivered by experts or respected journalists . 
Men like Wickham Steed, John Hilton, Harold Nicolson, Vernon Bartlett, Richard 
t The News department was a subsidiary of the Talks department until 1934. After this time, the News 
department became a separate unit. 
41 Scannell and Cardiff, p. 161 
t There was a short, two-month interregnum when a caretaker director of talks, J.M. Rose-Troup, took 
over the department for a few months until the arrival ofMaconachie in early 1936 . 
42 Some called Maconachie' s arrival a 'swing to the right' . (Scannell and Cardiff, p. 161) 
43 Scannell and Cardiff, p. 155 
44 
ibid. ' 18 
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Crossman and F.A. Voigt who dealt generally with foreign affairs, were all highly 
regarded by their colleagues and selected on the basis of their intellect, not necessarily 
their broadcasting ability . 
Although Matheson and Siepmann shared a fundamental outlook on the free 
exchange of information, they were bound to operate under specific rules governing 
controversy and political content. 'If once you let broadcasting into politics, you will 
never be able to keep politics out of broadcasting' argued the postmaster-general in 1926 
when testifying in front of a Parliament considering the incorporation of the British 
Broadcasting Company. 45 Issues that were broadcast were chosen in the main for their 
relevance to the current state of political and diplomatic affairs and their appeal to the 
listening audience. Many key issues, and particularly those considered diplomatically 
sensitive by the Foreign Office, were treated delicately, often watered down and always 
carefully scrutinized internally. It must be remembered that although most talks and panel 
discussions were broadcast live, they were always scripted and, after 1934, always passed 
through the hands of Foreign Office officials before broadcast. t Any news talks that 
hinted at bias were to be avoided. When contentious issues did threaten to creep into 
broadcasting, the Corporation was seen to retrace its steps and adhere to its conservative, 
placatory guidelines . 
It is impossible to write an account of the BBC's handling of the Jewish crisis in 
Germany without considering a few basic factors. Many executives within the 
Corporation and the Foreign Office understood the severity of the anti-Jewish persecution . 
There were individuals involved with either ( or both) of these institutions who had spent 
time in Nazi Germany and who chronicled their experiences and observations. The 
Foreign Office had incredibly insightful and acute accounts of the Jewish situation in 
Germany, the most compelling evidence for which is to be found in the Public Records 
Office. Countless documents relating to this very issue were exchanged and discussed 
from the earliest, most overt form of Nazi state-sponsored anti-Semitism; the 1 April 
45 ibid., 23 
1 Reith and Foreign Press Office (FPO) representative Robert Vansittart agreed in 1934 to clear all 
manuscripts for broadcast with the FPO before they could air. For more on this see below, pg. 36 
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boycott of 1933. Detailed reports were sent regularly to the Foreign Office from the 
British Embassy in Berlin discussing, in depth, acts of anti-Semitic violence from the 
smallest German villages to cities like Berlin. BBC reporters sent letters back to 
Broadcasting House from their remote locations, detailing their own experiences and 
sometimes describing the Jewish condition. But what does this tell us about the editorial 
process that failed to 'tell the whole story'? It is difficult to know how well these 
correspondents understood the defining racial feature of Nazi Germany. It is also difficult 
to gauge their own perceptions of the racial state, especially m a climate of racial 
categorization not dissimilar to that which operated in Britain . 
The 1930s were years of economic strife, social and political stratification and 
diplomatic instability. Those who had experienced war vowed never to revisit its 
devastation and no price seemed too high to avert disaster. Perhaps this was the 
underlying factor which determined Britain's attitude that the affairs of Germany were of 
no consequence to Britain. Perhaps it was this sentiment that echoed in Chamberlain's 
notorious words when he cried out: 'How horrible - fantastic - incredible - it is, that we 
should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far-
away country between people of whom we know nothing.' 
46 Rarely, if ever, do complete 
sets of correspondence and memoranda survive. The challenge presented to an historian 
by incomplete documentation is to remain balanced when piecing together the existing 
material to form an accurate narrative. The available evidence points to an institution, the 
BBC, which neither grasped the implications of Nazi anti-Jewish persecution nor was it 
particularly concerned about the issue. Why there was ' no story' is the real story . 
46 BBC Scripts, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, 'Mr. Chamberlain to the Empire', 27 September 
1938. Chamberlain' s response to the Sudeten crisis . 
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PARTI 
THE BBC, APPEASEMENT AND THE FOREIGN OFFICE 
The aim of the News Department has been to 
give the most important of the day's news, and 
treat it with complete impartiality. 
BBC Annual 1937 
19 
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Every morning BBC employees arrive at Broadcasting House and walk under the 
carved stone figures of Prospero and Ariel, jutting out from the building's facade. In 1931 
Reith had Shakespeare's Prospero and Ariel, the former a fair-minded autocrat, the latter 
his dutiful and mystical servant carved into the building perhaps to symbolize the 
relationship between the Corporation and its employees. t The fundamental feature of 
British broadcasting was to be objectivity and fair-mindedness and the fundamental task its 
employees were to carry out was the spread of information in a fair-minded manner. The 
connection between Prospero and Ariel and the Foreign Office and the BBC also parallels 
the reality of the Corporation's relationship with the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office 
was, in many ways, Prospero to the BBC's Ariel. Perhaps for some it was a daily 
reminder of the relationship between the Corporation and the state. It was a relationship 
that also reflected the uncertainty of the interwar period . 
The 1930s inaugurated a period of technological advancement which facilitated the 
exchange of communications. The wireless revolution was not only taking place in the 
United Kingdom but all across Europe. Radio Paris, Radio Luxembourg and the German 
Reichs Rundfunk Gesellschaft broadcast a whole new world of information into the homes 
of their listeners. 1 The most significant impact of the wireless was, perhaps, its 
accessibility to listeners from outside the political boundaries of a particular country . 
Rapid technological improvements allowed listeners in Britain, Germany, France and 
elsewhere to receive short-wave broadcasts from international news bureaus. Many 
international organizations, as a result, saw radio technology as a substantive mechanism 
through which to advance the cause of mutual understanding. The League of Nations was 
particularly intrigued with this possibility and encouraged member states to comply with a 
convention called 'Broadcasting for Peace' . 
2 Under the terms set out under the League 
t There has been little written on the architectural features of Broadcasting House which could in itself, 
merit a thesis. The building was (and is still) a technological and architectural masterpiece. The figures 
of Prospero and Ariel were probably inserted to symbolize the emergence of a new British institution. 
Shakespearean scholars often point to Prospero as the literary figure who most represents Shakespeare and 
Shakespeare represented everything about British culture to which the Corporation aspired. 
1 The German wireless, the Volksempfanger, significantly advanced the Nazi state's ability to carry out 
propaganda on a mass scale. The Nazis popularized the wireless in Germany by introducing a cheap 
version in 1933. By 1939, Germany had the highest percentage of wireless owners in the world. in 
Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham (eds.), Documents on Nazism 1919-1945 (London, 1974), 340 
2 Public Record Office at Kew, Foreign Office Papers /371/20487 1936. (hereafter PRO FO) 
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treaty, broadcasts relating to foreign affairs were required to adhere to a particular 
standard. If a Radio Paris account of life in Britain were to be broadcast, for example, 
certain provisions providing for objective reporting were to be adhered. The League also 
created an arbitration body which would settle any disputes between foreign nations 
concerning broadcast accounts. § The representatives responsible for enforcing the treaty 
in Britain were officials from the Foreign Office . 
Foreign Office officials also represented British broadcasting at the League of 
Nations. The problem with official representation of BBC affairs was that it infringed 
upon the Corporation's independent and unofficial status as a news provider. t 'If this 
convention ever comes into force,' asked one Foreign Office official 'shall we not have to 
institute a rather closer system of supervision than at present?' 
3 Under a current 
agreement between the Corporation and the Foreign Office, the BBC forwarded all 
manuscripts meant for broadcast to the latter. The Foreign Office, in tum, could make 
editorial suggestions to BBC officials who almost always complied with them. 
4 Any 
official acceptance of the League convention, therefore, would shift editorial responsibility 
onto the British government and give the appearance that the Corporation was an official 
organ of the state. 'It's [the BBC's] responsibility (and, therefore, under the Convention, 
ours) is proportionally heavier,' wrote one concerned Foreign Office official. 
5 
Several historians have attempted to deal with the issue of British broadcasting 
policy and state intervention. The most recent account was included as a chapter in Paddy 
Scannell and David Cardiffs social history written in 1991. In dealing with the BBC and 
the Foreign Office, however, the account presents little new information. Scannell and 
Cardiff come to the same conclusion as Bryan Haworth to whom they are indebted . 
Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest that they drew upon the material available in 
the Foreign Office archives. Haworth' s conclusion, published in 1981, prefigures that 
§ Germany, which had by this time withdrawn its membership from the League of Nations, did not take 
part in the convention. 
t The 'unofficial' status of the BBC meant that it did not represent the 'official' views of the state . 
3 PRO F0/371/20487 1936, internal Foreign Office minutes, 6 May 1936. 
4 For more, see below pp. 37-38 
5 PRO F0/371/20487 1936, internal Foreign Office minutes, 6 May 1936. Rex Leeper, an official at the . 
Foreign Office, in agreeing with the sentiments of his colleagues warned that the Foreign Office had to 
'walk very warily in seeming to censor news.' 
21 
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presented here; that the BBC was a willing partner of the Foreign Office. He writes: ' the 
essential factor in insuring the docility of the BBC was neither the action of the Foreign 
Office nor the advice of journalists but the nature of the institution itself' 
6 The evidence 
presented in Haworth's piece, which draws considerable material from the Foreign Office 
papers, remains relevant and valuable but it was written before the release of other 
documentation and the discussion he presents ends with the year 1936. As a result, 
Haworth does not discuss the broadcasting policy shift that was to take place in 1936; a 
retreat, on the part of the BBC, from broadcasting material excessively critical of Nazi 
Germany. Before 1936, as we shall see, and as Haworth shows, the Foreign Office 
complained about what they saw as 'pro-German' broadcasts. After this time, and as a 
direct result of the state's policy of appeasement, the Foreign Office influenced the 
Corporation to promote positive accounts of Germany . 
Conversely, Anthony Adamthwaite has characterized the BBC as a ' reluctant 
partner' of the Foreign Office. 7
 His piece on the BBC's relationship with the state during 
the Munich crisis, published in 1983, suggests that a majority of BBC executives were 
reluctant to 'toe the official line' . 8 While Adamthwaite's central conclusion supports the 
argument that Foreign Office intervention saw the BBC adopting a more cautious 
approach to news controversy, he implies that the BBC was unhappy about this 
arrangement and even controlled against their will. 
9 Adamthwaite's interpretation of the 
evidence does not examine, in full, the extent to which broadcasting emerged as a 
significant factor during the appeasement talks. Because his discussion is limited only to 
one year, it fails to show the pattern of BBC collaboration with the Foreign Office after 
1934. Asa Briggs has written: 'While there was liaison between the Foreign Office and 
the BBC in the field of listener research, this did not influence programme policy.' 
10 The 
BBC, as subsequent sections shall explain, was not a reluctant partner of the Foreign 
Office and the 'liaison' between the Corporation and the Foreign Office went much further 
6 Haworth, p. 51 
7 Anthony Adamthwaite, 'The British Government and the Media, 1937-1938' , Journal of Contemporary 
History, vol. 18 (1983), 281-297 
8 ibid., p. 293 
9 ibid. , He writes that the BBC was 'firmly on the leash'., p. 282 
10 Briggs, vol. II, p. 374 
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than cooperation on matters relating to listener research. Much like Ariel, the Corporation 
cooperated with the state dutifully. In relation to its status as an independent news 
organization, the BBC, by 1934, had voluntarily surrendered a significant amount of its 
editorial independence to the Foreign Office . 
This first part attempts to explain why 'political' reports, especially those relating 
to foreign affairs and specifically, German affairs, were controversial and approached 
delicately. It is also an examination of how the BBC news department was able to make a 
rational connection between 'objectivity' and diplomatic expediency in order to serve as a 
silent partner in helping the Foreign Office to pursue a policy of appeasement. A result of 
this relationship was the watered-down broadcast coverage of ' negative' issues which 
were alleged as internal to the political affairs of Germany . 
I. Appeasement and broadcasting' s emergence 
The interwar period provided British diplomacy with a challenging and strenuous 
time. The lingering psychological impact of a war fought less than fifteen years prior to 
the rise of the Nazi regime formed the foundation for Britain's foreign policy - a policy 
determined to avert the disaster of another war. Although Britain was bound to her 
neighbors through previous treaties (for example the Locarno Pact), a growing sense of 
isolationism began to dominate the state's approach to foreign affairs during the 1930s. § 
Isolationist diplomacy transformed into a policy of appeasement by the second half of the 
decade. Much has already been written about appeasement. 
11 We know that it was a 
policy designed · to maintain international stability in the diplomatic realm or as Martin 
Gilbert writes, 'a policy of hope' . 
12 The primary benefactor of appeasement, in fact its 
conscious target, was Germany . 
s The Locarno Pact , signed on 1 December 1925, created a nonagression agreement between France, 
Germany and Belgium and was guaranteed by Britain and Italy. 
11 see Martin Gilbert, The Roots of Appeasement (London, 1966) 
12 Gilbert, p. 14 7 
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In the 1930s, Germany emerged as the most significant potential threat to 
European stability. A renewed militarism, an aggressive rearmament plan and political 
speeches tinged with warlike rhetoric quickly replaced the moderate nationalism of the 
Weimar republic. The Foreign Office, eager to sustain European diplomatic stability, 
carefully pursued the maintenance of positive Anglo-German relations carefully. While the 
new German regime embarked on a course determined to dismantle the terms set out 
under the Versailles treaty, the Foreign Office turned a blind eye. Indeed, by 1935, the 
two nations agreed on terms to control naval rearmament even though Germany's actions 
violated the Versailles treaty. t Although Nazism presented a new diplomatic challenge 
for the Foreign Office, the specter of Eastern Communism was viewed throughout 
Whitehall as the greatest danger to British sovereignty. Hitler's regime, while seen as an 
unsavory form of government, was considered a lesser threat and even a bulwark against 
Eastern expansion. While there were individuals within the Foreign Office throughout the 
1930s who viewed Nazism unfavorably, the maintenance of stable Anglo-German relations 
prevailed above personal sentiment and political differences. Before his first meeting with 
Hitler in 1937, Lord Halifax, who was soon after to become Britain's foreign secretary, 
(succeeding Antony Eden), wrote: 'Although there was much in the Nazi system that 
offended British opinion (treatment of the Church; to perhaps [a] less extent, the treatment 
of Jews, treatment of Trade Unions), I was not blind to what he [Hitler] had done for 
Germany and to the achievement from his point of view of keeping Communism out of his 
country and, as he would feel of blocking its passage West.' 
13 This fear of Communism 
and the commitment to maintaining European diplomatic stability determined the Foreign 
Office's approach to German issues . 
The policy of appeasement was, above all, about British interests and the stability 
of Anglo-German relations proved crucial in the maintenance of Britain's status as a world 
power. By the time the Munich negotiations had formally commenced in 1938, Foreign 
Office officials had even considered a plan to develop a limited Anglo-German military 
t German naval rearmament was a violation of the terms set out under the Versailles treaty which 
restricted the extent of German rearmament. 
13 Gilbert, p. 162 
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alliance - one which might pose a challenge to the terms set under the Locarno Treaty.
14 
The Foreign Office, in addition, was concerned about creating the proper cultural climate 
in which to advance appeasement. The forces which might enable this climate included 
the media, and particularly broadcasting . 
The policy of appeasement was not simply about diplomatic maneuvering. The 
pursuit of appeasement transcended the . consciousness of political and cultural 
organizations, the press and most importantly, the BBC because these were institutions 
which had a profound impact on the way Germany was perceived within Britain. While 
the free exchange of information was not significantly hampered among foreign news 
agencies during the pre-war Nazi period, German officials made no secret of their 
contempt for the way the British media covered Germany. The maintenance of stable 
Anglo-German relations, at times, hinged on the appeasement of German officials who 
were concerned about the negative press the state received in Britain . 
The relationship between the Foreign Office and the media, therefore, was affected 
by the former's cautionary approach toward Anglo-German diplomacy. But while certain 
sectors of the British press angered Germany, these usually functioned outside the realm 
of state control. The BBC, by contrast, operated as an independent organization but was, 
by definition, a state-supported institution. The nature of the Corporation's standing, 
then, was such that the Foreign Office felt it could reasonably assert its agenda upon it and 
expect the BBC to cooperate. That is not to say the Corporation was a tool of the state 
nor did the state have the organic power to exercise direct control over BBC policy. The 
14 In a memorandum written by Foreign Secretary Antony Eden for the Committee on Foreign Policy in 
February 1938, he circulated a number of proposals dealing with the Anglo-German appeasement talks . 
(PR0/371/21555, 1938) In return for a British promise not to 'stab Germany in the back' if attacked from 
the East, Britain considered asking Germany to grant 'assurances' in regard to Central Europe and to 
return to the League of Nations. In an earlier memorandum, entitled Annex II 'Draft Despatch to Sir 
Neville Henderson, Berlin', written in October 1937, Eden proposed a more aggressive approach toward 
appeasement. One surprising consideration outlined possible British action in the event Germany was 
attacked by France: 'If a new Western Treaty can be concluded, His Majesty's Government would be 
ready, in the conditions prescribed in that Treaty, to come to the assistance of Germany in the event of an 
unprovoked attack upon her by France. Apart from this case, in the event of an unprovoked attack upon 
Germany, His Majesty's Government would observe neutrality, unless the circumstances were such to 
produce the application of the provisions of the Covenant against the Power which had attacked 
Germany.' (Paragraph 13, clause 5) It should be noted, however, that the above proposals were among 
many circulated within the Foreign Office. These particular proposals were eventually marked: ' Action 
was suspended, and this draft was not dispatched' . 
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influence exercised over the BBC by the Foreign Office came as a result of the 
Corporation's willing cooperation. BBC executives had no illusions about the source of 
the Corporation's existence and were not so arrogant as to shun their accountability to the 
public and by extension, the state. They were receptive to criticism and inbred with a self-
imposed duty to cooperate with the state. 
15 
II. The Foreign Office and German grievances 
A naval treaty between Britain and Germany and the renewed sense of European 
instability altered the diplomatic role of the Foreign Office from 1936. The impact of 
broadcasting featured prominently in the maintenance of Anglo-German relations and the 
Foreign Office now shifted its focus to broadcasts which exacerbated tension between the 
two states. From 1936 onwards, German complaints against BBC broadcasts began to 
arrive regularly at the Foreign Office and the British Embassy in Berlin. 
16 Both the 
Foreign Office and the British embassy increasingly began to lodge their own complaints 
against BBC news bulletins, usually representing the concerns of German officials. After 
one BBC broadcast, in 1937, which implied that a retraction made on the part of the 
German newspaper, Volkischer Beobachter, came as a result of 'official' British pressure, 
the deputy ambassador to Germany, Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes wrote to the Foreign 
Office that 'this sort of thing tends to undermine the foundations of goodwill he [ the 
ambassador Sir Neville Henderson] has been so successfully building up. It is also an 
embarrassment to me with my alleged "red" reputation as I had made a good start with 
Goering.' 17 Another BBC bulletin, in 1938, mentioned a report claiming that Germany 
15 After one offending broadcast in 1934, a member of parliament asked the post-master general 'whether 
he will order the excision in future of all comments on foreign affairs in the programmes of the British 
Broadcasting Corporation.' Although the BBC was understood to be an independent organization, the 
state constantly sought to exert greater control over its broadcasts. PRO F0/395/515 1934, Mr. Boothby 
(MP) to the House of Commons . 
16 PRO FO 371 18862 1935 
17 PRO FO 395/552 1937, Ogilvie-Forbes to William Strang of the FPO, 10 July 1937. The original 
report in the V6/kischer Beobachter stated that Britain was supplying aid to insurgent refugees in Spain . . 
The newspaper retracted the statement after the British embassy made an informal protest on account of 
the report's inaccuracy. The BBC implied that the retraction came as a result of formal protests . 
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had sealed her border with Austria although making it clear that the report was only a 
rumor. 18 A tense Henderson wrote to the Foreign Office in response to the BBC bulletin: 
I feel constrained to draw your attention to [the] grave prejudice which can be 
done to our relations with Germany as well as with other countries [if the] B.B.C. 
with its heritage of high reputation lends itself to spread by sensation-mongers of 
fantastic rumours. It is [ ... ] particularly unfortunate that this lapse should have 
occurred at this juncture on the eve of my conversations with Herr Hitler and of 
his speech on February 20th. 
19 
Embassy officials, who were carrying out the agenda of the Foreign Office, complained 
regularly about the damaging impact of broadcasting on Anglo-German relations . 
Diplomatic success, they believed, relied on the BBC's conforming to the aims of the 
Foreign Office. Whether this meant a complete retreat from controversy or simply closer 
cooperation between the BBC and the Foreign Office was of little consequence. As long 
as the issue of broadcasting remained high among German grievances against Britain, the 
Foreign Office would maintain a direct interest in the content of news broadcasting . 
The era of aggressive appeasement, begun in late 1937, found the issue of 
broadcasting playing a significant role in direct German grievances against the British 
state. 2° Control over BBC broadcasting became a major factor in the negotiations leading 
up to the Munich agreements of 1938. When Lord Halifax visited Germany on a goodwill 
mission in 193 7, he received numerous complaints from German officials protesting the 
BBC's alleged anti-German bias. § Halifax promised Goebbels that he would do his best 
to insure that the Corporation did not broadcast explicitly anti-Nazi views. t According to 
Scannell, on the eve of the Anschluss, Lord Halifax asked the press and the BBC not to 
make personal attacks on German leaders as this would only contribute to the tense 
18 PRO F0/395/613 1938, Henderson to the Foreign Office, 14 February 1938. It should be noted that the 
BBC made an attempt to confirm the story with Gennan press officials but failed to receive a reply. 
19 ibid . 
20 A 17 February 1938 report in the German newspaper Vo/kischer Beobachter protested what it saw as an 
anti-German bias in the BBC. The publication argued that until 1934 the Corporation handled the 
German revolution in an objective manner. PRO F0/395/613 1938, Henderson in a report to the Foreign 
Office, 17 February 1938. 
§ One result of this complaint was that Prime Minister Chamberlain had an·intemal unit set up to monitor 
BBC broadcasts. 
t Halifax was meeting regularly with Sir John Reith by the end of 1937 and made it clear that he opposed · 
broadcasts which offended German officials. see below p. 32 
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relations between the two nations. 21 So when the Wehrmacht rolled into Vienna, the 
BBC failed to offer live coverage. In fact, the only coverage given to the Anschluss at all 
was in brief news bulletins . 
By 1938, Foreign Office officials were well-versed in the German attitude towards 
the BBC and were increasingly receptive to their complaints. One official noted: 'Goering 
[ ... ] told me that Herr Hitler's chief cause for resentment against [the] British press and 
[the] B.B.C. was that'[. .. ] there was no story too wild or improbable [for them]. 22 In a 
meeting with Hitler and Ribbentrop, the British ambassador to Germany, Sir Neville 
Henderson, also noted that Hitler expressed his concern that the British media had 
unnecessarily meddled in the internal affairs of Germany. 23 The Foreign Office, in an 
attempt to mitigate the impact of the BBC on Anglo-German relations, encouraged 
Henderson to listen receptively to Hitler's complaints. 24 Henderson sought to mollify the 
concerns of German officials at the highest levels, by notifying them of the agreements 
forged between the Corporation and the Foreign Office. 25 During a meeting with Hitler, 
Henderson confidentially informed the German leader of the efforts made to ensure that 
unfavorable reports would be minimized. The ambassador informed Hitler that Lord 
Halifax was to meet BBC officials to emphasize 'the responsibility for peace resting on 
men in these positions' . 26 Henderson also assured Hitler that, unlike the previous foreign 
secretary, Lord Halifax was much more knowledgeable and understanding of the 'German 
attitude' . 27 Halifax, soon after, met John Reith to discuss an impending BBC feature on 
German colonial claims. 'The result of the discussion,' noted Halifax 'would probably 
21 Scannell and Cardiff, p. 82 
22 PRO F0/371/21555 1938, Henderson to the Foreign Office, 18 February 1938. on a recent conversation 
with Goering . 
23 PRO F0/371/21656 1938, Henderson to the Foreign Office, 3 March 1938. He wrote: 'The Chancellor 
pointed out that for three years[ ... ] complete silence has been observed in Germany in the face of all 
English attacks. But whereas Germany had never intervened in internal English affairs, Ireland etc. [ ... ] 
English attempts at intervention[ ... ] had continued uninterruptedly.' 
24 AE Sargent of the Foreign Office wrote: 'I hope that Sir N. Henderson will be allowed to say something 
about the B.B.C.. the behaviour of which is one of Hitler's chief and - ifl may say so - best-founded 
grievances.' PRO F0/371/21709, internal Foreign Office minutes, l March 1938. He also noted that 
Henderson should express his agreement with Hitler on this issue . 
25 see below p. 40 
26 PRO F0/371/21656 1938, Halifax to Henderson, 3 March 1938 
27 ibid. 
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have been unfavourable to the German claim.' 28 Reith had agreed to cancel the program 
at Halifax's strong encouragement. The foreign secretary had asked Henderson to notify 
Hitler in a subsequent meeting of the Corporation's actions. ' I should be glad if you could 
convey to the Chancellor in confidence intimation of the action taken by the B.B.C. on 
their own initiative as a token of their desire not to create difficulties,' he wrote to 
Henderson. 'You should at the same time make it clear that the B.B.C. have acted 
independently.' 29 The Foreign Office was determined to minimize the appearance of 
control over the wireless. The practice of inconspicuous suggestion gave the Foreign 
Office the advantage of being able to divorce itself publicly from the actions of the 
Corporation and also to claim indirect credit for the BBC's restraint. Most important to 
Foreign Office officials handling the issue of broadcasting, was the elimination of a source 
of grievance which might hamper diplomatic efforts. In order to do this, the Foreign 
Office required the complete cooperation of the BBC . 
The subsequent section shall examine more closely the relationship between the 
BBC and the Foreign Office during the interwar period. A highly complex relationship 
emerges, marked by ambiguity and contradiction. The BBC was never subject to direct 
censorship during this time. Any, and all, pre-emptive action taken to avoid controversial 
topics which might exacerbate international or domestic instability came directly from the 
BBC. That is not to say the Foreign Office did not play a role in helping the Corporation 
to chart a prudent course. From the earliest BBC reports dealing with Germany, the 
Foreign Office, and particularly its information wing, the FPO, took a great interest in the 
way foreign news was disseminated. But at no time during this period did the Foreign 
Office apply direct pressure over the Corporation to eliminate material which might 
otherwise complicate international relations. The Foreign Office had a specific agenda and 
diplomatic officials believed that success depended partially, on BBC cooperation . 
:s PRO F0/371/21679 1938, Halifax to Henderson, 4 March 1938 
19 PRO F0/3 71/21679 1938, Halifax wrote the following to Henderson on 4 March 1938: 'Some months 
ago the B.B.C. arranged a talk on the German Claim to Colonies in which well-known speakers were to 
take part for and against[ ... ] In view of the conversations in Berlin I saw Sir J. Reith yesterday who 
agreed that he would on his own responsibility cancel the arrangement. It was clearly understood between 
us that there was no question of government intervention. [ ... ] I am most anxious to avoid giving the 
impression that the Government are attempting to muzzle either the B.B.C. or the press. Our intention is 
merely to instil! a sense of responsibility in difficult and delicate circumstances.' 
29 
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Without the active and enthusiastic participation of the BBC, the Foreign Office would 
have been placed in a much more difficult position . 
The principle of objectivity dictated the Corporation's approach to news reporting . 
Never was there an attempt on the part of the Foreign Office to define the editorial 
standards to which the BBC was to adhere. The BBC approach to news dissemination, 
one that encompassed the desire to see both sides of an argument, fair-mindedness and 
sometimes censorship were wholly organic ones, developed within the Corporation. 
30 
Serving the cause of appeasement, both indirectly and directly, required the BBC to 
formulate strict policy guidelines outlining what was and was not acceptable for broadcast. 
There is no evidence to suggest that Foreign Office officials threatened the Corporation in 
any serious manner, nor did it have the power to do so. The BBC played a significant role 
in helping to carry out the state's official policy of appeasement on its own accord. There 
is no evidence to suggest that the BBC had any desire to contradict the wishes of the 
government. The control of foreign news dissemination was voluntary and self-imposed . 
In many instances, as we shall see, the Corporation exercised great restraint sometimes 
canceling programs outright that were deemed to be a 'risk' by the Foreign Office or 
another state agency. To function outside the state's approval was seen by many in the 
BBC as imprudent and irresponsible. Perhaps the anxiety that motivated a government 
policy of appeasement prevailed within the walls of Broadcasting House also . 
m. Controlling controversy 
Early on officials within the Foreign Office began to appreciate the potentially 
powerful role broadcasting could play in the international arena. BBC broadcasts, after 
all, served not only the British listening public but were easily accessible on the continent 
as well. Because most European wireless agencies were controlled largely by the 
respective state, many foreign listeners and state officials assumed that the BBC was also 
closely regulated by the state. BBC foreign affairs coverage, as a result, was closely 
30 see below pp. 41-52 
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scrutinized abroad. This foreign perception associated BBC broadcasts with official 
pronouncements and views. 'The fact that the B.B.C. is ultimately controlled by the 
Government means that listeners, especially abroad, are inclined to take it for granted that 
the Government has a certain responsibility for "talks" on public affairs,' argued one 
Foreign Office official in 1934. 31 The question of broadcasting, therefore, gained an 
increasingly important role by 1934 among the internal concerns of the Foreign Office. 
Before 1935, the rise of political extremism at home caused varying degrees of 
consternation among Foreign Office officials. Any broadcast perceived as being favorably 
disposed towards either Soviet or German extremism was vigorously opposed . 
The arrangement established between the BBC and the Foreign Office was as 
complex as the state of Anglo-German diplomacy during the interwar Reich period. In 
1934, for example, the Foreign Office complained to the Corporation about a report 
dealing with the Nazi anti-SA purge for its pro-German bias. By 1937, however, the 
Foreign Office often expressed its distaste for broadcasts which might portray the German 
regime in a negative light. But it was not only Anglo-German diplomacy that defined the 
editorial standard of foreign news. If the Foreign Office remained consistent on one 
account throughout the 1930s, it was their fear of Communism and the belief that the 
Corporation devoted far too much broadcast time to pro-Communist reports. The 
maintenance of international relations and the impact of broadcasting, thus, increasingly 
became intertwined as the decade wore on. The Foreign Office pursued an agenda whose 
success, it believed, hinged on cooperation between itself and the BBC. Until 1934, the 
BBC came into contact with the Foreign Office rarely. In limited exchanges the 
Corporation consulted the Foreign Office on proposals to broadcast from foreign 
locations, but little else. Vernon Bartlett, the BBC's first 'foreign correspondent', 
proposed, in 1933, a series of reports to be given from various European capitals.
32 While 
no official inside the FPO disapproved of the Bartlett trip, many had reservations about his 
31 PRO F0/395/515 1934, 'Meeting on Broadcasting of News Commentaries and Talks on Foreign 
Policy' , Foreign Office official Willert ' s comments, 11 April 1934 
32 for more on Bartlett, see below pp. 71-73 
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proposed visit to Moscow. 33 The visit to the Soviet Union, feared one FPO official, 
'would in my opinion be eminently undesirable. The BBC have already given the Soviet 
govt. [sic] too much propaganda. '
34 Although Bartlett had also proposed a visit to Berlin 
which would include interviews with several Nazi leaders, not one FPO official expressed 
hostility. The main request among FPO officials was to avoid surrendering the 
microphone to Communist rhetoric. Bartlett agreed not to broadcast the voices of his 
subjects but to quote their words in his own voice. 'If I do ask for permission to quote 
their ipsissima verba, to select statements which would be pacifying rather than 
provocative,' he assured the Foreign Office.
35 For the time being, the Foreign Office 
worried little about the wireless and its diplomatic consequences. Any fear among FPO 
officials relating to the wireless was reserved for broadcasts airing the views of 
' extremists', and most particularly, Communist extremists. Foreign office officials, at this 
time, were concerned more about the domestic impact of these kinds of broadcasts than 
their international implications. 
' 
Until 1935, therefore, virtually all complaints lodged against the BBC emerged 
solely from the Foreign Office. While at times officials within the Foreign Office 
complained about a 'Manchester Guardian' attitude among BBC officials, they were 
equally concerned about the publicity given to the German state. 
36 The first major 
complaint the Foreign Office lodged against the BBC came after a broadcast given by 
Richard Crossman detailing the Nazi anti-SA purge. Crossman's account was condemned 
for what the Foreign Office interpreted as its pro-German bias and its lack of critical 
analysis. 37 Foreign Office officials protested Crossman's lack of objectivity and what they 
33 Stan Walker of the Foreign Office called the Moscow trip a 'Tower of Babel Scheme'. PRO 
F0/395/487 1933, internal FPO minutes, 23 January 1933 
34 ibid. 
35 ibid., Bartlett to Rex Leeper, 15 February 1933 
36 PRO F0/395/476 1933, minutes ofan FPO meeting, 4 January 1933. 'Manchester Guardian· was a 
euphemism for the Foreign Office's belief that the Corporation was far-too sympathetic with the left. 
37 This was particularly ironic in light of the fact that Crossman was considered, among his 
contemporaries, as anything but pro-German. In fact, the Oxford don had a reputation for harboring left-
wing views. Even John Reith acknowledged this in his diaries. After a meeting with Crossman on 2 
March 1934, the director-general wrote: 'Saw one Crossman, whom Siepmann is putting up for a fairly 
important job - a Socialist but I liked him.' cited in Anthony Howard, Crossman: The Pursuit of Power 
(London, 1990), 46. Crossman's earlier reports dealing with Germany could even be considered blatantly · 
anti-German. In one 1934 account, predating the anti-SA massacre, Crossman clearly chose a selective 
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saw as his glorification of the purge. 38 'It has been a personal triumph for Hitler and has 
proved how completely dependent on him the whole Nazi movement is,' reported 
Crossman from Berlin. 'What Hitler says is law - and law in a very practical sense; as 
these events have proved. But its is not only law in the sense of compulsion, but right in 
the sense of winning universal approval.' § Crossman's report also featured interviews 
with various German officials who expressed their support for the purge. 'The very fact 
that Mr. Crossman expressed no criticism seemed to suggest that he was actually 
approving the Hitler murders,' wrote one angry Foreign Office official. 
39 Robert 
Vansittart at the Foreign Office suggested Crossman' s talk was 'rather sickening and not 
at all objective' . 40 The significance of the Crossman account, however, was not limited to 
the Foreign Office' s anger over its seemingly pro-Nazi content. 
The private row between the two institutions inaugurated a fundamental change in 
the relationship between the Corporation and the Foreign Office. The change was to 
include a mutual, and private arrangement between the BBC and the Foreign Office to 
work in closer cooperation in order to avoid any 'unduly tendentious or ill-informed 
cross-section of Germans to interview when he first drew attention to the anti-Semitic face of the German 
state: 
the small shopkeeper told me he backed Hitler because he was against large-scale industry 
and was going to close down the big Jewish stores which were ruining his trade . 
an elderly Professor said to me (by the way, I quote his actual words) 'I disagree with most 
of the party policy, but I do hate the way the Jews got all the jobs before the Revolution 
(1933], and I just worship the physical and spiritual beauty of Adolf Hitler. He knows we 
want good Germans in our Universities, not clever intellectuals. (BBC Scripts, Crossman, 
'Germany, the Inner Conflict', 7 June 1934) 
Crossman saw in the German state an ideological aberration in the conte>..1 of 1930s Europe. There was 
something strange about the monolithic nature of the people, he felt, and one which had to be exposed at 
the most basic level. 'Every time the position [of the Nazis] grew unbearably tense,' he read ' some 
foreign political or racial issue is found by which the facade of unity can be maintained.' For Crossman, 
the idea that a consistent element rooted in hatred within the state could bind the people unilaterally -
whether it be the 'Jews or the League of Nations' - spoke much about the danger the German state posed. 
(Crossman, 'The Inner Conflict') This danger, Crossman implied, presented a daunting reality not only 
for Jews but for Germans whose actions reflected an uncivilized racial ideology. . 
38 Sir Robert Vansittart of the Foreign Office called the report ' sensation-mongering Hearstliness, man-
on-the-spot and red-hot stuff' . PRO F0/395/515 1934, Vansittart in FPO minutes, 5 July 1934 
§ It should be noted that the text of Crossman's original broadcast no longer exists at the BBC Written 
Archive Center. The PRO file, however, quotes the account in depth. 
39 PRO F0/395/515 1934, Orme Sargent in minutes ofa FPO meeting, 5 July 1934 
40 PRO F0/395/515 1934, Vansittart in FPO minutes, 4 July 1934 
33 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
The BBC, Appeasement and the Foreign Office 
statements which affect international relations'. 
41 The irony of the agreement was that 
although it emerged in the wake of the Crossman account - one perceived as pro-German 
- the arrangement was eventually to come to secure broadcasts that did not offend German 
officials. From this point on, the Foreign Office was keen on seeing the BBC adapt its 
foreign affairs coverage to reflect the current aims of the diplomatic process. So while 
Foreign Office officials may have condemned the Crossman account as too mild in its 
criticism of the events taking place in Germany in 1934, a shift in attitude among 
diplomats was to see the tables tum by 1936. What emerged from the Crossman account 
and a previous broadcast allowing a German official to denounce the terms of the 
Versailles treaty was an aggressive attempt, on the part of the Foreign Office, to create an 
informal arrangement between itself and the BBC. 
42 At the suggestion of Colonel Alan 
Dawnay, then-BBC controller of programmes, Reith would meet monthly with Robert 
Vansittart (later Sir) to discuss issues of broadcasting and all texts of talks on foreign 
affairs were to pass through the Foreign Office before broadcast. 
43 Reith also 
commissioned Rex Leeper of the Foreign Office to give the BBC some suggestions on 
how to handle talks on foreign affairs. Leeper made the following suggestions; either one 
or two regular speakers, a panel of experts, or reports from foreign capitals. 
44 In 
addition, at the suggestion of the FPO, all talks manuscripts were to be forwarded to them 
before broadcast. Any reservations harbored by FPO officials regarding talks content 
would be vetted from the manuscripts. t The repercussions of this agreement were to 
affect all subsequent BBC broadcasts dealing with foreign affairs. The Corporation, 
furthermore, was not to make this agreement public and any public responsibility for BBC 
broadcasts was to fall solely on the Corporation. 
45 The next year, the BBC Annual 
carried the following statement: 'During the year, controversial broadcasting had 
41 ibid., words of Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon, 5 July 1934. Reith acknowledged many of the 
criticisms leveled at the Corporation's supposed left-wing bias. In 1937, he told the King that the left-
wing bias of news organizations was a 'plague spot' . (McIntyre, 231) 
42 see below pp. 46-4 7 
43 PRO F0/395/515 1934, it should be noted that news bulletins, which were filtered from Reuters 
accounts were not vetted by the Foreign Office. 
44 PRO F0/395/515 1934, FPO minutes, 11 April 1934. also noted in Scannell and Cardiff, p. 70 
t All talks and interviews were read off manuscripts. Nothing was broadcast over the air unless it was 
written down and approved . 
45 Scannell writes that the agreement ' made nonsense of the supposed independence of the BBC.', p. 77 
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probably diminished. An increasing sense of the potential influence of a broadcast had led 
to an increasing wariness among interested parties and, within the Corporation, an 
increasing concern for an adequate representation of as many views as possible.' 
46 
The agreement between the Corporation and the Foreign Office, however, was not 
without its contradictions. Because the nature of Anglo-German relations fluctuated 
throughout the first half of the 1930s, the Foreign Office could not stipulate specific 
guidelines for handling foreign affairs broadcasts. As a result, the BBC Talks department 
was to interpret Foreign Office wishes in its own way. The concept of objectivity, the first 
commandment of the Talks department, was to be altered to reflect the implied desire of 
the Foreign Office. After 1936, objectivity included a strict Corporation policy intent on 
appeasing its German critics and one whose repercussions were to affect the content of all 
German news thereafter. 
By 1936 the wishes of the Foreign Office and the broadcast policy of the BBC 
were virtually indistinguishable. The Foreign Office was particularly concerned about 
issues which touched on contemporary political affairs. What the Foreign Office 
suggested the Corporation should avoid were talks dealing with the political extremism of 
the left and right. One suggestion from the BBC, a twelve-part series on 'The Citizen and 
His Government', in 1935, was to include an installment featuring Sir Oswald Mosley and 
the well-known British Communist Harry Pollitt. The Foreign Office opposed this 
particular series mainly on the grounds that it would allow Pollitt an opportunity to 
address a wide audience. The Foreign Office had mounted several complaints with the 
Soviet government for filling the British airwaves with pro-Communist propaganda and 
believed that the Pollitt broadcast might fly in the faces of those protesting against Soviet 
actions. Reith had the series canceled agreeing not to publicly disclose the intervention of 
the Foreign Office. 47 
A similar situation occurred between the Foreign Office and the BBC in 193 7 
when the Talks department broadcast a talk by John Hilton speaking on Soviet Russia . 
Hilton' s talk was criticized by many in the FPO for being far too sympathetic with the 
46 BBC Annual 1935, p. 86 
47 Scannell and Cardiff, p. 75 
35 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
The BBC. Appeasement and the Foreign Office 
Soviet state. 48 In the contemporary press, Hilton's speech was denounced as ' left wing 
propaganda' . 49 The Foreign Office, which presumably approved the broadcast, reacted to 
it only after receiving several complaints from both listeners and state officials. V ansittart 
believed that the issues of Communism and Fascism could not be discussed over the air 
without 'their taking the form of either polemics or propaganda'. 
50 In a subsequent 
meeting with Reith, Vansittart suggested that 'in the very difficult and even critical times 
in which we lived it was most important for the B.B.C. and the Foreign Office to 
collaborate in every possible way and not in any circumstances to cross the wires.' It 
would be better, argued Vansittart, if the BBC gave 'no prominence for the next year at 
least to lectures either on Communism or Nazi-ism' . 
51 Reith agreed to comply with 
Vansittart's suggestion and the Corporation dealt exclusively with the political issues of 
Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany, not ideological ones, from this point forward. 
52 
As the efforts to maintain a stable diplomatic relationship with Germany shifted 
modes, the Foreign Office increased its requests on how to handle news relating to 
Germany and Nazism. The BBC and the British press, as has been discussed above, were 
organizations whose power played a significant role in the appeasement talks. So 
important was the cooperation of the BBC, that the newly-appointed foreign secretary, 
Lord Halifax, arranged regular meetings with Reith often suggesting that the Corporation 
should moderate its reports dealing with Germany. Before one meeting, the Foreign 
Secretary wrote: 
I intend to speak to Sir John Reith[ ... ] making it clear that what I am saying is not 
an instruction from the Government, but merely the expression of a desire on their 
part that the British Broadcasting Corporation should bear in mind the extreme 
sensitiveness [sic) both of Hitler and Mussolini to British Broadcasting 
Corporation "talks" and presentation of news in order that difficulties on this score 
should be eliminated or reduced as far as possible, more especially at a time when 
48 PRO F0/395/546 1937, Charles Peake at the FPO wrote: ' It has been suggested to me that the fact it 
being allowed to be made is yet a further example of the B.B. C.' s red proclivities.', 16 March 193 7 
49 ibid., clipping from the Daily Mail, 16 March 1937. The original text of the broadcast no longer exists 
but is quoted in the memorandum . 
50 ibid., Vansittart on a meeting with Reith, 16 March 1937 
51 ibid . 
52 Briggs writes: ' In the last two years of the peace, there were few series of talks which compared in 
excitement with those of the earlier 1930s, and controversy itself began to seem somewhat vieuxjeu.' 
(Briggs, vol. II, p. 139) 
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an attempt is being made by the Government to negotiate settlements and improve 
relations. 53 
For senior officials at the Foreign Office, the question of broadcasting presented a serious 
matter in which they felt they had to intervene. It was perhaps a testament to the cultural 
and political strength of the BBC that less than ten years after its incorporation, its impact 
on Anglo-German diplomatic stability was so significant. 
The relationship (and its evolution) between the Corporation and the Foreign 
Office between 1933 and 1938 reveals both the importance of broadcasting's perception 
among Foreign Office officials and the often contradictory policies of the diplomatic 
process. Although it was the Foreign Office that encouraged closer cooperation between 
itself and the BBC, the Corporation never sought to challenge the nature of the 
relationship. Serving the cause of appeasement, whether it was a conscious process or 
not, superseded the highest commandment of BBC news dissemination: to find the truth 
and tell it. The Corporation developed its own editorial policy on how to handle 'delicate' 
news items. Often, news editors were much more cautious than FPO officials in what they 
would and would not permit to be broadcast. It was also comparatively rare for Foreign 
Office officials to complain to the BBC over .manuscript conflicts. The Corporation 
instituted a system of self-imposed censorship strict enough to pre-empt most complaints . 
By the middle of the 1930s, the BBC, wrote one historian, became a 'creature of the 
government'. 54 It was the Corporation's own editorial control which contributed to the 
lack of hard-nosed journalism. Because the BBC functioned after 1934, effectively, under 
the tacit approval of the Foreign Office, there often were 'disturbing gaps' in the way it 
handled delicate news items. 55 
53 PRO F0/371/21656 1938, Halifax to Henderson, 2 March 1938. 
54 Alice Goldfarb Marquis, 'Written on the Wind: The Impact of Radio during the 1930s, Journal of 
Contemporary History, volume 19 (1984), 398 
55 Marquis, p. 399 
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IV. The practice of appeasement broadcasting 
The pressures applied on the Corporation by the Foreign Office were always 
discreet and always packaged as simple recommendations. As an independent 
organization, the BBC always maintained complete control over its editorial policy . 
Neither the success of the Corporation nor its survival hinged on cordial relations with the 
Foreign Office. Furthermore, recommendations emanating from the Foreign Office were 
left intentionally vague in the belief that the Corporation cooperated voluntarily, as a 
responsible organization. The maintenance of diplomatic stability in cooperation with 
broadcasting was not in the direct interest of the Corporation as a news provider, but most 
certainly appealed to individuals within Broadcasting House. Those who controlled 
editorial policy were rarely ideologues and usually keen to support the policies of the 
state. Men like John Reith and Cecil Graves, the controller of programmes, recognized 
the importance of their positions and appreciated the contribution they were making to the 
advancement of mutual understanding, both domestically and internationally. The BBC 
provided listeners at home with a particular view of their own world and became, by the 
rnid-l 930s, a 'central agent of the national culture' . 
56 British broadcasting also offered 
foreign listeners a window onto the life of Britain. Senior staff at Broadcasting House 
were well aware of the extent to which their broadcasts reached thousands across Europe 
daily. They were also made aware of foreign criticism either directly, or through the 
Foreign Office . 
As the relationship between the Corporation and the Foreign Office evolved, BBC 
staff became increasingly selective as to what could and could not pass for acceptable 
broadcasting. Just as objectivity marked the content of talks and features, the concept was 
extended to avoid offending foreign governments. The BBC was particularly keen on 
appeasing their German critics. The Corporation's role as a cooperative partner with the 
state meant that the content of foreign news, particularly news coming out of Germany, 
was highly regulated. The result, of course, meant that the quality and complexity of news 
56 Scannell and Cardiff, p. 278 
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analysis suffered. Before one broadcast on Germany, Lionel Fielden wrote to the 
correspondent: 
Owing to the present state of things in Europe, there is a good deal of nervousness 
on both sides about the possible effects of broadcast talks, and therefore it is really 
essential that we should have your manuscript at least a couple days beforehand so 
that we have time to make any modifications we may think necessary, and also so 
that we are in a position to talk to the German authorities if any difficulty arises at 
the last moment. 
57 
Any news talks that hinted at bias were to be avoided. The news department was 
particularly cautious about upsetting the Foreign Office and often applied editorial 
standards in a far stricter manner than required. 
58 Most issues which might present a 
controversy saw the news department adopting a ' pre-emptory' system of management. 
By applying strict editorial standards and taking an extremely cautious line, the 
Corporation would ' pre-empt' any grievances lodged by either the Foreign Office or the 
German government. After Harold Nicolson submitted his script for one talk on 
Germany, his editor decided to remove a reference to violent persecution. ' In my 
opinion,' wrote George Barnes of the Talks department, ' (the reference to persecution] 
should be deleted because we had been asked by the Foreign Office not to mention the 
crisis [Sudeten Crisis], and it seemed to me that a story in which listeners' sympathy was 
enlisted against Nazi methods was not keeping to the letter of our promise.' 
59 On the eve 
of the Anschluss the BBC was to run a series entitled 'The Way of Peace'. One panelist, 
Sir Josiah Wedgwood MP was axed because he wanted to give a list of Hitler's demands 
and intentions. 'Concrete charges of this sort,' went one memo, 'which are at the most 
conjecture, ought not to be given the great publicity of the microphone.' 
60 It was better 
to avoid controversy rather than take a risk which might upset the state or a foreign 
government. In a 1935 series entitled 'Freedom and Authority in the Modem World', 
57 BBC WAC, Victor Bodker contributor files, 1932-1962 file I, letter from Lionel Fielden to Bodker, 11 
April 1934 
58 These standards also transcended those of the correspondents themselves. One correspondent, before 
leaving for Gennany to produce a report promised not to 'bring the B.B.C. into disrepute in either Nazi or 
Fascist circles.' BBC WAC Sir Eveyln Wrench file I, 1932-34, Wrench to Lionel Fielden, 20 April 1933 
59 BBC WAC Harold Nicolson Files, 3A, 1938, Barnes in an internal BBC memo on Nicolson's 
manuscript for a talk on the Sudeten Crisis, 5 September 1938 . 
60 Scannell and Cardiff, p. 82 
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Richard Crossman was replaced with a panelist who 'stands centre-right and would 
describe the Nazi regime objectively and not unfavourably.' 61 On another proposed 
speaker for the series about freedom, Siepmann said: 'If Shroedinger is not going to talk 
against Nazism, but only to discourse on English freedom, there is no objection [to his 
being invited].' 62 When one reporter proposed a talk on nationalism, the reply from his 
producer spoke of the 'danger of riding the internationalism horse a bit too hard [ ... ] with 
so much national feeling still about, one has got to walk very delicately.' 63 After his talk 
on Germany, Sir Evelyn Wrench was commended by Siepmann noting that the talk was 
'just what we wanted at this particular juncture, when nations are so frightened at each 
other.' 64 When the BBC did upset a foreign government, Reith could play the double role 
of unofficial diplomat and BBC representative . 
As early as 1933, Reith found himself extending an apology to the Polish 
ambassador in Britain on behalf of the British government after a New Year's eve report 
which was received unfavorably in Poland. 65 Reith was approached by officials at the 
FPO and it was recommended that he make a formal apology to the Polish government . 
The director-general complied, expressing his regret at the 'inadvertent' and 
'inappropriate' references made. 66 On the eve of the Anschluss, Reith assured the 
German foreign minister that the 'BBC was not anti-Nazi' after von Ribbentrop suggested 
otherwise. 67 The impact of the Corporation and its broadcasts reverberated through 
official German circles and it was not uncommon for BBC executives to be approached by 
German diplomats both through official and unofficial channels. A talk on the 
61 BBC WAC RSI/188, talks on freedom and authority 1934-35, G.N. Pocock, talks executive, in a 
memorandum, 11 February 1935 
62 BBC WAC RSI/187, talks freedom 1935-36, Siepmann in internal memorandum, 20 February 1935 
63 BBC WAC Sir Evelyn Wrench contributor file I, 1932-34, Fielden to Wrench about the latter's desire to 
give a talk on nationalism, 20April 1933 
64 BBC WAC Sir Evelyn Wrench file I, Siepmann to Wrench, 10 April 1933 
65 The talk, entitled 'New Year over Europe' featured a broadcaster pretending to walk across the map of 
Europe, welcoming in the New Year when in actual fact, the broadcast took place in London. While 
'broadcasting' from East Prussia, the speaker spoke of the people 'who are separated from the main body 
of their countrymen by the Polish Corridor' . The report also mentioned that thirty percent of Poland' s 
annual e>..i,enditure was reserved for purposes of defense. PRO F0/395/476 1933 
66 PRO F0/395/476 files 17-26 1933, undated memorandum from Reith 
67 On the eve of the Anschluss, Reith apologized to German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop for a report . 
the latter had objected to. The director-general assured the foreign minister that the 'BBC was not anti-
Nazi '. (Marquis, p. 409) 
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Czechoslovak crisis, broadcast in May of 1938, evoked a sharp rebuke from Dr. 
Fitzrandolph of the German embassy in London. 'Any talks which we broadcast must not 
necessarily be taken as representing the views of His Majesty's Government or even of the 
BBC,' responded Malcom Frost of the BBC public relations department. 
68 
As broadcasts often featured attempts to engage in mutual understanding, 
especially when dealing with German affairs, the news department entered into their own 
informal relationship with the German RRG. During the interwar period, the BBC and the 
RRG communicated regularly, often calling for broadcast exchanges and clarifying reports 
which the one broadcast outfit felt was reported incorrectly by the other. As a result of 
this informal relationship, the BBC sought to encourage a tone of mutual understanding . 
As mentioned above, the BBC saw its role as a foreign news provider primarily to help 
stabilize any outstanding tensions between Britain and Europe. Any expression of opinion 
or appeal to the listeners usually called upon them to 'show Germany that we want to try 
to understand the present mentality of the German people' . 
69 Cecil Graves, later to 
become controller of programmes, visited Germany for a week in August 1934 in order to 
forge a formal relationship between the two broadcasting outfits. Upon his return, Graves 
described his private audience with Goebbels and his attendance at a performance of the 
Hitlerjugend: 
The impression left at the end of this function was a mixed one, the mass of 
uniforms of all kinds, S.S. guards everywhere, the marching and counter-marching 
of the uniformed Hitlerjugend [ ... ] all took me back to the last time I went to 
Germany in August 1914. On the other hand the impression created by the singing 
and dancing of these young people was attractive, fresh and spontaneous and I 
could not [ ... ] recapture that same dominating militaristic atmosphere of twenty 
years ago. 10 
Dr. Kurt von Boeckman, director of the RRG' s short-wave service, later wrote to Graves 
on the benefits between 'close cooperation between nations and rapprochement between 
civilised peoples' and spoke of their 'complete harmony of views' . 
71 
68 PRO F0/395/560 1938, Frost to Foreign Office, 17 June 1938 
69 BBC Scripts, Evelyn Wrench, 'What Germany was Thinking Last Week', 10 April 1933 
70 BBC WAC El/744, D.E.F. 's (Cecil Graves) visit to Germany 1934, report on visit 
71 ibid. , von Boeckman to Cecil Graves, 11 September 1934. Briggs writes on von Boeckman: 'German 
short-wave broadcasting[ .. . ] was given a high priority inside the Reichs Rundfunk Gesel/schaft, and his 
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The visit encouraged BBC representatives to arrange for cultural broadcast 
exchanges and to develop an informal agreement whereby reports deemed inaccurate 
would be clarified by the other party. Many of the cultural exchanges included youth 
discussions and art or book reviews. Often these German broadcasters were given a fairly 
wide scope under which to express their views. Indeed, even expressions of anti-Jewish 
sentiment sometimes made their way into these broadcasts: 
Already years before the Revolution you could observe how a small group of 
writers was gradually making headway in its attack against the then prominent 
type of literature. This group of writers which was supported by publishers with a 
feeling of public responsibility began to voice its thoughts about the social 
functions of literature. At an age when literature was preoccupied with the 
emotions of individuals, frequently those of abnormal character, this new group 
had to struggle against the advertising powers of publishing companies and 
influential critics as well as the then patronised authors, categories in which the 
Jewish element was well represented. 
72 
In another 'cultural exchange', the German youth representative did not hesitate to note: 
'65 million Germans and only one-half million Jews[ ... ] True democracy wouldn't let that 
one-half million rule 65 million.' 
73 
In the aftermath of the Munich crisis of 1938, the newly-appointed Director-
General, F.W. Ogilvie, proposed a new series of 'talks exchanges' between Britain and 
Germany which was to be 'a solid contribution to mutual understanding and so to peace.' 
74 In endorsing Ogilvie's plan, British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax wrote: 'The 
Germans would have the advantage of stating their views to British listeners, but I 
consider that the risk of their saying something harmful to be more than outweighed by the 
advantage of conveying a sober presentation of the British outlook to German listeners.' 
75 
In other efforts to bring about a reciprocal understanding between Germany and Britain, 
the Talks Department often invited pro-Nazi Germans to address British audiences over 
the wireless. Prior to this proposal, one speaker, Herr von Rhenbaden, denounced the 
[von Boeckman's] staff were treated as being of equal importance to those in German home broadcasting.' 
(Briggs, II, p. 364) 
72 BBC Scripts, Dr. Ernst Deissmann, 'On Foreign Bookstalls: What Germany is Reading', 20 June 1934 
73 BBC Scripts, Ferdinand Winkel and Stephen Taylor, 'European Exchange I: Germany', 4 December 
1935 
74 PRO F0/395/564 1938, memorandum from Ogilvie to the FPO, 28 December 1938 
75 PRO F0/395/564 1938, internal FPO memo from Halifax, 28 December 1938 
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Versailles treaty in a such a condemnatory fashion, it inspired an angry Foreign Office 
official to ask the BBC whether they might like to announce the British point of view on 
Versailles from the Reichs Rundfunk Gesellschaft. t Siepmann, in reply to the FPO joked, 
'I am afraid the Germans will hardly be willing to offer us equivalent facilities over their 
wireless system. The world might be a brighter and a safer place if that were possible!' 
76 
The Talks department also ran a series entitled 'How Others See Us', most of which 
allowed for considerable criticism of Britain by foreign speakers. One such talk featured a 
German Nazi who attacked the policies of Britain and noted how the British had 
deteriorated as a race by permitting the 'infiltration of foreign elements' into British 
national life. 77 One listener expressed his anger with the broadcast in a letter to the Daily 
Telegraph: 
For a quarter of an hour on Sunday evening the British Broadcasting system was 
placed at the disposal of a Nazi propagandist, who was kind enough to tell us that 
although we are not without certain virtues we are really a stupid and decadent 
race. 
In so far as we allow foreigners to use our wireless system for purposes of 
advertising their own particular brand of politics, we are indeed a stupid people. 
78 
The attempt to come to a better understanding of the policies of the Reich also 
saw many BBC broadcasters draw comparisons between the new 'radical' Germany and 
stable Britain. British public policy was familiar to listeners and any similarities between 
what Germany was attempting to accomplish and what conflicts Britain had already 
resolved provided listeners with the ability to better understand Germany's process of 
'renewal' . One account reported: 'He [Hitler] had won over the support of the 
industrialists for a little Roosevelt recovery scheme of his own. There is to be a forty-hour 
week, young people will be kept out of the factories by raising the school age, and various 
other steps are to be taken which, as far as I can see, bear the closest possible resemblance 
to the aims of our own Labour party.' 
79 Listeners too were informed that they could hold 
t As the majority of original BBC scripts were lost or damaged during the Second World War, the original 
text ofvon Rhenbaden does not survive either in manuscript form or in the Listener . 
76 PRO F0/395/515 1934, letter from Siepmann to Orme Sargent at the FPO, 4 June 1934 
77 PRO F0/395/546 1937, again, the original script of the broadcast does not survive but significant 
quotations from the broadcast are drawn in this file. 
78 ibid., a letter from Mr. George Liverman to the Daily Telegraph, March 1937. 
79 BBC Scripts, Vernon Bartlett, 'Indignation is not a Political Attitude', 20 September 1933 
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personally opposing views toward the repressive measures of the German state but were 
not in a position to judge them. These were, after all, the. internal affairs of Germany . 
'We object if foreigners criticise our policy in Ireland or India,' went one report 'still more 
do the German's object if we criticise the German government's policy toward German 
citizens.' 80 Another broadcaster noted: 'I do feel [ ... ] strongly that what we want in the 
world at present time [ ... ] are people who are ready to listen to what the "other fellow" 
thinks [and] not what they think he ought to think.' 81 Pleas to 'Germany that we want to 
try to understand the present mentality of the German people,' often went out over the 
airwaves. 82 Passive or ' polite' opposition, furthermore, was encouraged as a preferred 
form of resistance. While Jewish communities and others in Britain undertook to take 
concrete measures against Germany (like boycotts), this type of action would only 'harden 
the heart, and strengthen the position of those whose acts are condemned,' argued one 
broadcaster. 83 
Any critical account of the 'new Germany' often went to great lengths to show the 
effects of the new regime on the population and the economy. Indeed, until the outbreak 
of war, Germany's transformation was characterized and described as a 'revolution', an 
example of the adoption of the language of the Nazi party. The enviable qualities of the 
regime were highlighted with reports dealing with such issues as youth labor camps and 
military-style training units, describing them as examples of 'German thoroughness' . 
84 
'We have heard so much lately about the misdeeds of the Nazis,' went one account, 'that 
there is a real danger of their constructive work being ignored [ ... ] there are many lessons 
for the rest of us- to learn from the reorganisation of [Germany].' 
85 These accounts 
illustrated German industrial and social discipline and economic efficiency. 'Under Hitler,' 
went one report 'in three years, there has been a very remarkable revival, in Germany, not 
80 ibid. 
81 BBC WAC, Sir Evelyn Wrench file I, 1932-34, Wrench to producer J.A. Ackerley after the talk ' What 
Gennany was thinking last week', 11 April 1933. It should be noted that Wrench was not only a regular 
broadcaster but the founder of the staunchly pro-appeasement movement, the English-speaking Union . 
82 BBC Scripts, Wrench, ' What Germany was thinking', 
83 BBC Scripts, Lt. Col. Sir Arnold Wilson, 'A fortnight in Germany', 23 May 1934 . 
84 BBC Scripts, S.K. Ratcliffe, 'My glimpse of the new Germany', 31 July 1933. 
85 BBC Scripts, Sir Charles Petrie, 'The week abroad: highlights in world affairs ', 17 May 1933 
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only of faith and hope and courage, but of industrial activity.' 
86 And while not everything 
about the new regime could benefit each individual, Germany's new approach to state 
organization reflected a positive, quasi-utilitarian model of government. One reporter 
noted: 
I am firmly convinced that far more people are happy under the present German 
government than under any preceding one [ ... ] if the great majority of the people 
have new hope, a new feeling of comradeship and all the rest of it, ought a 
democrat to feel that this greater good for the greatest number should cancel the 
fact that a small minority is suffering martyrdom for its beliefs? 
87 
Often, the Nazi policies of persecution were presented as a by-product of political 
circumstances and not overt hatred. Broadcasters went to great lengths to stress to their 
listeners the complexity of the German situation and the difficulty with which the outside 
world had in understanding their internal circumstances. Bartlett noted: 
It is not so easy to be reasonable and tolerant if, like most of the Nazis of today, 
you have been bewildered first by a war, which you lost; secondly, by a 
revolution, in which everything you had been taught to respect was overthrown 
and despised; thirdly, by inflation which completely wiped out all your savings, 
and fourthly, by a graver unemployment problem than that known in any other 
European country. Nothing, to my mind can excuse bullying and brutality, but 
some things can help to explain it. 88 
Another broadcaster pointed out that 'civil war was avoided by putting Communist 
leaders in concentration camps.' 89 The Nazi 'revolution' was, after all, a revolution and 
the repercussions of a revolution often went hand in hand with emergency measures, 
implied many of the broadcasts. One account pointed out: 'There seem to be periods of 
crisis or transition when quick decisions are essential and, consequently, when the ordinary 
citizen ought to be ready to forget some of his selfish or personal interests for the good of 
the state.' 90 The rise of the Nazi movement to power, in addition, was explained as an 
86 BBC Scripts, John Hilton, 'Blunders in Berlin', 8 July 1936 
87 BBC Scripts, Vernon Bartlett, 'Foreign Affairs: Dictators and Democracy', 28 March 1934 
88 BBC Scripts, Bartlett, 'Indignation ... ' 
89 BBC Scripts, Wilson, 'Fortnight' 
90 BBC Scripts, Bartlett, 'Dictators and Democracy' 
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almost inevitable process, one which came 'partly [out] of the sufferings and repression of 
neady twenty years' . 91 
From the beginning of the Nazi regime, presenters sought to strip away Hitler's 
hard veneer and portray his position as a complex one, but one which ultimately benefited 
the people. Most broadcasters also believed Hitler's rhetoric would tone down with time . 
He was viewed in much the same way other dictators were viewed and his approach to 
government was interpreted as one not too far from those of Mussolini, Stalin and even 
Dolfuss. The picture that early emerged was of a man struggling to bring his country back 
to a dignified position. One report noted: 
Being himself the son of a peasant [ ... ] Hitler is a great believer of the physical 
and moral effects on the land. Furthermore, since this compulsory labour will 
affect young German of every class, he will get rid of social barriers just as they 
were got rid of during the War. 
I am afraid we shall need much patience and sympathy, but there is a lot of good 
in the Nazi movement and it is very much to our interest that somehow he [Hitler] 
should bring it out. 92 
It was not uncommon to portray Hitler in a positive light and when his policies seemed to 
defy rationality, like the destruction of 'degenerate artwork', reports often came to his 
defense. 'At least he [Hitler] honours art to the extent of believing that its misuse can 
encompass the cultural destruction of a people; and equally that when purged and healthy 
it can be the greatest agent in national regeneration,' said one art review. 
93 
The relationship between the BBC and the RRG and its direct impact on broadcast 
policy regarding German news, however, should not be overstated. It is significant, 
though, that executives within the Corporation could express personal hostility toward 
Germany's anti-Jewish policy, while at the same time this had no direct impact upon the 
relationship with the RRG. When the BBC produced slightly flawed reports on the Jewish 
situation in Germany, the RRG was quick to point out the error, and the clarification was 
appreciated by the Corporation. After a somewhat inaccurate BBC broadcast relating to 
91 BBC Scripts, Sir Arthur Salter, 'The week abroad: the Nazi revolution', 15 March 1933 
92 BBC Scripts, Vernon Bartlett, 'The week abroad: The Austro-German contretemps', broadcast from 
Vienna on 22 June 1933 
93 BBC Scripts, Herbert Read, 'Hitler on art', 22 September 1937 
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war pensions, von Boeckman felt comfortable enough to write the BBC, courteously 
pointing out a flaw in the report: 
We should [like] to point out that the item on your news bulletin: 'Jewish officials 
must resign by the 31 st of December ofthis year. If they fought in the War, they 
will receive a pension.' although correct, was not exhaustive. All Jewish officials 
resigning on the 31st December will receive pensions, irregardless whether they 
served during the war or not. Those Jews, however, who served with the Gennan 
colours during the war until they reach the age-limit will even receive full pay and 
thereafter a pension.' 
The actual item of news transmitted by us is attached for your 
information . 
Your item aportaining [sic] to the definition of Jews might also lead to 
misapprehensions: 
'A Jew is defined as being anybody with three or four Jewish grandparents, or 
anybody who is married to a Jew, or has certain other Jewish connexions.' 
In another of our bulletins we stated: 
' A man is a Jew before the law if he has at least three Jewish grandparents. A 
person with two Jewish grand parents is considered to be of mixed descent. 
Anyone descending from two Jewish grand parents is also regarded as being of 
mixed Jewish blood under the following circumstances: that he either belonged to 
the Jewish religious community at the time when the law was passed or joined that 
Jewish religious community after the law was passed. If the person of mixed 
blood was married to a Jew at the time the law was accepted or married a Jew 
after the law became known.' 
Before the law, therefore, a Jew is not 'anybody who is married to a Jew' 
as you put it, but 'a person of Jewish descent married to a Jew at the time the law 
was passed or married to a Jew after the law was published.' 
94 
What is particularly interesting about the above correspondence relating to this specific 
news bulletin is how the 'flaw' is treated in such a pedantic manner by the Corporation . 
There was no attempt to verify the accuracy ofvon Boeckman's claim by the controller of 
programmes and the mistake was treated as a routine news error. Von Boeckman's first 
clarification, however, was misleading and not totally accurate. 
95 And while it was not 
uncommon for news organizations to correspond on matters relating to reporting 
94 BBC WAC El/760/1 , countries: Germany: German short-wave service file I: 1933-1945, letter from 
von Boeckman to Graves, 26 November 1935 
95 Article IV, Section 2 of the Reich Citizenship Law states: ' Jewish officials will retire as of 31 December 
1935. If these officials served at the front in the First World War, either for Germany or her allies, they 
will receive in full , until they reach the age limit, the pension to which they were entitled according to the 
salary they last received; they will, however, not advance in seniority. After reaching the age limit, their . 
pensions will be calculated anew, according to the salary last received, on the basis of which their pension · 
was computed.' (Noakes and Pridham, p. 466) 
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inaccuracies, von Boeckman' s frank clarification reflected the accessibility of the 
information pertaining to the anti-Semitic features of the Nazi state. It should be noted 
that the Corporation carried the original report in a standard news bulletin and no attempt 
to analyze the implications of the law was made either in a talks form or otherwise. In his 
reply, Graves thanked von Beeckman 'for letting us know the full facts' . % The 
subsequent BBC news bulletin canied the revised information von Beeckman provided . 
The principle of objectivity and the desire to forge a 'mutual understanding' would have 
the BBC handle the gaffe in no other way. These ideals were consistently applied to 
broadcasts dealing with Germany . 
V. The Foreign Office, the 'Jewish Question' and the BBC 
This discussion, so far, has provided the background necessary to understand the 
issues raised in the second half How did the complex relationship between the Foreign 
· Office and the BBC impact on the reporting of anti-Jewish measures in Nazi Germany? 
The connection between the Corporation's careful regulation of news content relating to 
Germany meant that detailed information about the anti-Jewish crisis suffered as well . 
Perhaps the most compelling factor in relating news about anti-Jewish persecution was 
that it never emerged as a contentious issue between the BBC and the Foreign Office . 
The culture in which the Foreign Office and the BBC operated reflected the attitude they 
took both toward persecution and its broadcast coverage. 
97 Throughout the 
1930s, the Foreign Office received detailed information concerning the plight of Germ~n 
Jews from its embassy in Berlin. The issue never played a role in the policy matters 
relating to appeasement and the British government remained virtually silent on the matter 
throughout the 1930s. 98 'H.M.G. are not and ought not to be the protectors of the 
96 ibid., reply from Graves to von Boeckman, 30 November 1935 
97 for more on cultural and social values, see below pp. 62-67 
98 One frustrated Jewish constituent wrote to Prime Minister Baldwin in 1935: 'Not one word has been 
publicly spoken by you to express the indignation and horror[ .. . ] at the cruel and relentless persecution of 
my co-religionists in Germany.' PRO F0/371/18863 1935, a 'Conservative [party) Jew' to Baldwin, 3 · 
November 1935 
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Jewish people,' wrote one diplomatic official in 1935. 99 Just as the Foreign Office 
discouraged the BBC from producing reports offensive to Germany, it saw the Jewish 
crisis as an internal and political problem of Germany and one which should not be dealt 
with in depth. Chief among their concerns regarding the Jewish 'problem' was the issue 
of refugees, the status of which officials never fully recognized. 
100 Palestine was another 
example and by 1936, the British government believed that it was 'not a suitable place for 
any substantial additional number of Jewish refugees.' 101 
Unlike the public, the Foreign Office was made aware of the extent of persecution 
and the degree to which anti-Semitism existed in Germany. As early as March 1933, the 
British Ambassador to Berlin, Sir Horace Rumbold, had written to the Foreign Office of 
the 'gross injustice' done to the Jews. 102 By the time the reverberations of official anti-
Semitism prompted thousands of German Jews to seek refuge in Britain, the secretary of 
state for home affairs feared a ' risk that the influx [ ... ] from Germany may include a 
certain number of Communists.' 103 Although barely 3, OOO refugees trickled in by the end 
of 1934, the question of Jewish immigration into Britain weighed heavily on the minds of 
Foreign Office officials. 104 The Foreign Office, in 1933, had considered imposing visa 
restrictions on German Jews entering Britain but realized that it could not be done without 
imposing visa restrictions on the entire German community. 105 To carry out a selective 
entry policy would be an admission of Jewish distinctiveness and the Foreign Office 
99 PRO F0/371/18859 1935, Eric Mills, commissioner for migration and statistics for the Palestine 
government, to the Foreign Office on his impressions of making a formal pronouncement against the 
actions of the Nazi state, undated in 1935. Mills, presumably, wrote this observation before embarking on 
a visit to Nazi Germany in November 1935. His report stated: 'While before I went to Germany I knew 
that the Jewish situation was bad, I had not realised as I do now, that the fate of German Jews is a tragedy, 
for which cold, intelligent planning by those in authority takes rank with that of those who are out of 
sympathy with the Bolshevik regime, in Russia; or with the elimination of Armenians from the Turkish 
empire. The Jew is to be eliminated and the state has no regard for the manner of his elimination.' in 
Martin Gilbert, Exile and Return: The Emergence of Jewish Statehood (London, 1978), 163-4 
100 Louise London, 'Jewish Refugees, Anglo-Jewry and British Government Policy, 1930-1940' in David 
Cesarani (ed.), The Making of Modern Anglo-Jewry (Oxford, 1990), 163. London writes that even in the 
most violent days of anti-Jewish persecution, the problem of refugees for the government remained an 
immigration problem rather than a duty to rescue . 
101 Gilbert, Exile and Return, p. 164 
102 ibid. . 157 
103 PRo' F0/372/2949 1933, Sir John Gilmour in a report to the home secretary, 18 April 1933 
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throughout the 1930s was hostile to viewing the Jewish crisis in any other way than the 
internal concern of Germany. '[Jews] have left Germany because they have been 
persecuted, but they are not technically refugees,' wrote one Foreign Office official. 'It is 
only stateless persons who are regarded by the League organisations as refugees, then 
German nationals who happen to be Jews do not fall within their competence. Any 
reference to the League in connection with this question [the influx of Jewish refugees] 
would therefore be, not within the technical sphere, but purely political.' 106 The Foreign 
Office shared the commonly-held view that an increase in Jewish refugees would result in 
an increase of anti-Semitism at home. In April 1938, the Home Secretary Sir Samuel 
Hoare stated: 'If a flood of the wrong type of immigrants were allowed in there might be 
a serious danger of anti-Semitic feeling being aroused in this country. The last thing which 
we wanted here was the creation of a "Jewish problem". ' 107
 
When the Foreign Office was pressed to encourage the BBC and other media 
organizations to publicize the anti-Jewish crisis in 1935, the response was less than 
enthusiastic. Geoffrey Pyke, a leading member of the Anglo-Jewish community and 
described by Rex Leeper as one who 'is fully akin to the defects as well as merits of his 
fellow Jews,' argued that references to anti-Jewish persecution should not be omitted from 
broadcasts. 108 He also argued that anti-Jewish persecution should be mentioned in the 
same breath as that of Catholics and Protestants. He pointed out that there was, what 
seemed like, · a willful disregard of anti-Jewish persecution in the British media. One 
Foreign Office official wrote that members of the British government should 'abstain from 
public criticism of the internal affairs of another country.' 109 Another argued that 'we 
have more than enough difficulties with Germany already without involving ourselves in 
matters on behalf of people who are after all German citizens.' 
110 After brief 
consideration, the Foreign Office concluded that they would not encourage the 
106 ibid., Charles Dodd in Foreign Office internal notes, ' Admission to United Kingdom of Jewish 
Refugees from Germany' , 6 April 1933 
107 Sir Samuel Hoare quoted in Geoffrey Alderman, Modern British Jewry (London, 1992), 279 
108 PRO F0/371/18861 1935, Leeper in internal memorandum, 27 May 1935 
109 ibid. , JP Perowne, of the Foreign Office, in internal minutes, 29 May 1935. 
11 0 ibid. , unnamed respondent in same internal FO minutes 
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Corporation to publicize the Jewish situation alongside the anti-Christian persecution. JP 
Perowne of the Foreign Office wrote: 
On the merits of the case [Pyke's memo] the persecution of Jews is just as 
reprehensible no doubt as the persecution of any other set of people, but Jews in 
Germany today are not being persecuted for quite the same reasons as are 
Protestants and Catholics. The latter are being persecuted because they hold 
religious [his underline] views which may in the view of the state prevent them 
from doing their duty as Germans first and foremost; the Jews are being 
persecuted on racial [his underline] grounds [ ... ] His Majesty' s Government 
cannot [ .. . ] be held to have any obligation to help German Jews resist German 
"ferocity" today. 111 
The Foreign Office was also able to justify its decision based on the belief that it would 
only worsen the situation for Jews in Germany. 'Formal representations to Germany 
would have unpleasant consequences certainly for Jews in Germany and perhaps for states 
making those representations' wrote one Foreign Office official in 193 5. 
112 
The decision to avoid publicizing detailed accounts of anti-Jewish persecution as 
an example of Nazi brutality was motivated implicitly by diplomatic factors relating to any 
negative publicity against Germany. The decision opposing the association, in the media, 
between anti-Jewish persecution and anti-Christian persecution was motivated by the 
perception of Jews as 'lesser' victims. To accept the belief that Jewish suffering should be 
viewed in the same light as any other kind ran counter to the social and cultural instincts of 
those in the Foreign Office who interpreted the events. The Foreign Office, further, was 
eager to encourage the BBC to promote 'mutual understanding' between nations . 
Broadcasts dealing with the topics of anti-Jewish persecution, or political matters relating 
to the condition of Jews in Germany (believed the Foreign Office) would serve to 
exacerbate Anglo-German differences. The Jewish crisis failed to trigger the sympathies 
of those in the Foreign Office because they were preoccupied with diplomacy. The 
diplomatic process superseded universal humanitarian principles and Foreign Office 
officials, along with BBC representatives, never felt compelled to carry out the task of 
addressing anti-Jewish persecution. The following example gives an indication of how far 
111 ibid., Perowne in minutes, 29 May 1935 
11 2 PRO F0/371/18859 1935, dispatch from Eric Mills, of the Palestine office, to the Foreign Office, 
undated in 1935 
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the policies of the Foreign Office were carried out by the BBC and illustrates the real 
source of restraint: the BBC . 
Coverage of the 1936 Olympic Games was to be the BBC's first major opportunity 
to take advantage of technological innovations in wireless communication and provide up-
to-the-minute updates on the sporting developments happening in Berlin. For over a year 
leading up to the Games, BBC representatives corresponded regularly with their 
counterparts at the RRG arranging broadcast studios and working out details concerning 
coverage of the Games. Any concerns over political circumstances in Germany rarely 
entered into the internal discussion of how to broadcast the Games. This was, after all, an 
event which dealt solely with athletic competition and no local human interest stories 
( which are a regular feature of modern Olympic coverage) were considered as part of the 
broadcasts. BBC coverage was to focus completely on sporting events and it would give 
the Corporation a chance to improve upon the performance of the printed press by 
providing live coverage. The Sports division (still under the command of the News 
department), was keen to supply high quality sports coverage and analysis and this would 
require highly skilled commentators. A gold medalist in the 1924 Olympics, Harold 
Abrahams was also the Corporation's most popular and widely respected sports 
commentator. t Abrahams, however, was Jewish and over the course of three months, 
executives debated on the prudence of sending Abrahams to Berlin as the BBC's 
representative. One director wrote: 
You will remember that at a Programme Board meeting in the late autumn we 
discussed the advisability of using Mr. Harold Abrahams as our commentator at 
the Olympic Games. It was then felt that while we were not prejudiced against 
him for racial reasons, it might be advisable to postpone a final decision as to his 
employment by us until nearer the time, when we should be able to see the state of 
feeling in Germany, and the consequent probability of their differentiating against 
him in the manner of facilities . 11 3
 
t Harold Maurice Abrahams (1899-1978) was the first European to win an Olympic gold medal in the 
100-meter dash. Abrahams' Olympic achievement is chronicled in the film Chariots of Fire (1982). As 
far as I am aware, no biography has been written on his life . 
113 BBC WAC, R47/578/l (2), Relays: Olympic Games 1936 Berlin, memorandum froin DOB (director of · 
broadcasting) to CP (controller of programmes), 5 December 1935 
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The Abrahams crisis represented the BBC's approach to any issue which might be of a 
delicate nature. It was the hallmark of the BBC's internal, self-imposed policy of extreme 
prudence, particularly in relation to Jews and Germany. While executives had legitimate 
concerns over the treatment Abrahams might encounter in Germany, it was far more 
important to respect the presumed wishes of the German officials. The controller of 
public relations wrote: 
The point about this is, of course, that Abrahams is a Jew. He is our best 
commentator on athletics. The question arises as to whether or not we should do 
this [label Abrahams as a commentator]. We all regard the German action against 
the Jews as quite irrational and intolerable and on that score we ought not to 
hesitate, but should we, as between one broadcaster and another, put aside all 
views of this kind and take the line that however irrational we regard another 
country's attitude to be it would be discourteous to send a Jew commentator to a 
country where Jews are taboo? 114 
The committee's final decision against sending Abrahams ('it would be definitely impolitic 
for us to send Abrahams as our official commentator') illustrated the complex nature of 
the Corporation during the 1930s. 115
 While on the one hand, radio represented 
innovation and technological progress, the BBC trod delicately between the path of 
principle and prudence, the latter almost always taking precedence. In this case, to send 
Abrahams was far too great a public relations risk . 
In part two, the discussion shall focus on how the anti-Jewish crisis was broadcast . 
The connection between the Corporation's participation in the state's appeasement 
strategy and the way German news was handled bore indirectly on the way the Jewish 
crisis was handled. While there were few instances to suggest that the BBC directly 
censored this kind of information, its dissemination was an indirect victim of the 
Corporation's policy relating to German news. Most importantly, however, there is no 
evidence to suggest that the Corporation ever encouraged the publicity of the anti-Jewish 
events in Germany . 
The cultural climate in which the Corporation operated helps to explain why the 
anti-Jewish crisis was not viewed as particularly pressing. European diplomatic instability 
114 ibid. , memorandum from Gladstone Murray, controller of public relations, to Cecil Graves, controller 
of programmes, 6 December 1935 
11 5 ibid., memorandum entitled 'commentator for the Berlin Games', 10 February 1936 
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weighed far heavier on the minds of the British public. Anxiety over the prospect of a 
forthcoming war also motivated the prudent course of the Corporation during the 193 Os . 
Above all, the attitudes held by many towards the anti-Jewish persecution, (which can be 
related directly to the inherent latent anti-Semitism of interwar Britain), believing it 
constituted a somewhat justifiable form of political and economic persecution, did not 
require the BBC to feature the situation in Germany prominently. The next part deals with 
these social attitudes and how they encouraged the widespread ambivalence toward the 
anti-Jewish crisis - an ambivalence which was reflected in the lack of detailed broadcast 
coverage given to the situation . 
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PART II 
THE BBC, JEWS AND NAZI PERSECUTION 
What is all knowledge too but recorded experience, 
and a product of history; of which, therefore, 
reasoning and belief, no less than action and 
passion, are essential materials? 
Thomas Carlyle 
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On 25 March 1933 the Daily Express published the banner headline ' Jews Unite in 
Move to Boycott Germany' . 1 The opening paragraph read: 'Fourteen million Jews, 
dispersed throughout the world, have banded together as one man to declare war on the 
Gefll1an persecutors of their co-religionists.' Only a month earlier, the same daily carried 
a series of ' easy-to-understand' versions of Christian Bible stories for children. The 
stories were touted as 'eminently suitable for filling up that difficult half-hour before bed-
time.' The first installment featured the story of the lame beggar cured by Peter and John . 
The two Apostles were described as men who joined Christ before he was 'put to death by 
the cruel Jews.' 2 The period which inaugurated the greatest crisis world Jewry was to 
confront found the Anglo-Jewish community in a position where the plight of their co-
religionists was not to find an overwhelmingly sympathetic response from their fellow 
countrymen. The Daily Express headline was to set the tone for the way in which the 
anti-Jewish persecution was perceived by the BBC during the 1930s and implicitly 
expressed to the public. The social subconscious in Britain seemed to support the 
perception that in Germany, Jews constituted a ' united' threat against the Nazi regime . 
The way that the anti-Jewish crisis in Germany was perceived among the British 
public was related to the way in which it viewed Jews. The Jews were regarded by many 
as a great and powerful force, equal to that, perhaps, of a nation. Few people in Britain 
openly supported the brutality of the Nazi persecution and even fewer fully understood its 
extent. The sources from which the majority of the public formed its opinions varied in 
the extent of their coverage of the crisis and this contributed to the widespread 
misunderstanding over the nature of persecution. By the time the Nazi regime came to 
power, the level of traditional anti-Semitism in Britain had reached an ebb. Mass 
perceptions of Jews, however, altered the common focus of persecution away from the 
perpetrators and towards the 'causes' of persecution. 
3 The general idea was that if the 
1 PRO F0/371/16720 1933, clipping from the Daily Express, 25 March 1933 
2 quoted in the Jewish Chronicle , 3 February 1933 
3 Kushner, p. 37 He writes: ' [The] search for rationality in Nazi anti-Semitism was to occupy the 
thoughts of many in the liberal democracies in the first years of Nazi rule. One solution was, despite the 
virulence of the Nazi assault, to cling to the liberal formula and see German actions as exaggerated, 
unjust, but understandable reactions to a real Jewish irritant. ' 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
The BBC, Jews and Nazi Persecution 
Jews were being subjected to some form of persecution, there must necessarily be a 
rational explanation behind it. 
As the great interpreter of common culture, the BBC viewed the crisis in much the 
same way. The BBC was, after all, a medium which reflected the society in which it 
developed. It did not reshape it. 
4 Asa Briggs has written: 'The historian has less 
difficulty in interpreting the institution than in interpreting the society in which it 
developed.' 5 This insight becomes all the more accurate when attempting to interpret the 
social and cultural attitudes held in Britain toward the Jewish community, and the crisis in 
Germany. As far as the BBC was concerned, the anti-Jewish crisis was a political problem 
and one which constituted an internal affair of Germany's. For the general public, it was 
seen largely as an economic problem complicated by Germany's revolution. For the 
Foreign Office, the anti-Jewish crisis was no concern of the British government and one 
which did not require an official response. The way in which all three of these bodies, the 
BBC, the public and the Foreign Office perceived the anti-Jewish crisis was related to the 
way in which the Corporation chose to handle the situation. This final part is an attempt 
to connect a common perception of Jews - a 'socially anti-Semitic' one if you like - and 
the anti-Jewish persecution, and its impact on how the BBC covered the situation. There 
was, as we shall see, a major discrepancy in what was going on in Nazi Germany and what 
was being reported by the BBC. The social climate of 1930s Britain determined the 
perceived importance of the anti-Jewish crisis. For a significant proportion of the British 
audience, ~t was to prove of secondary importance. For the Corporation, this ambivalence 
and the political reality of 1930s diplomacy translated into vague broadcast coverage. The 
BBC never gave any indication that they wanted to publicize these events in greater depth . 
I. Social anti-Semitism 
In Britain, by the end of the 1930s, it was anathema to hold violent views toward 
the Jewish community. Those who openly espoused violent anti-Semitism were largely 
4 Briggs, vol. II, p. 7 
5 ibid. , 13 
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peripheral figures. Even Oswald Mosley's British Union of Fascists, which attracted a 
considerable amount of support from the urban middle-classes, never succeeded 
politically. 6 As an ideology, anti-Semitism singularly failed to gain wide appeal as a 
political mobilizer. 7 The predominant liberal outlook of the 1930s required individuals to 
tolerate Jews and others who made an effort to conform to the dominant values of British 
society. 8 The small Jewish community in Britain functioned in a social environment which 
presented no official obstacles to their advancement. Jewish representation existed in 
many public institutions. But although Anglo-Jews were not legally restricted from taking 
high military posts, civil service commissions or other official roles, there was enough 
latent anti-Semitism in Britain to obstruct no more than token Jewish representation in 
many public spheres. 9 
Because the concept of social anti-Semitism is largely intangible, any definition 
relies exclusively on the perception of Jews among the British public. Unlike the 
conscious and even violent anti-Semitism of the late nineteenth century, social anti-
Semitism was a far more unconscious attitude, one which drew associations between 
Jews, economic power and racial stereotypes. 
10 It also distinguished Jews from 
Englishmen. Kushner writes: 'The cultural framework of "Englishness" [ ... ] determined 
reactions and responses of the [British public] to the persecution of the Jews.' 
11 The 
boundaries of a liberal society, one which embraced the concept of toleration, were 
limited. Toleration came at a price and one which was limited to the tolerance of those 
individuals who integrated fully into British culture. Bill Williams characterized this 
6 Alderman, p. 284 
7 Lebzelter writes: 'The lack of support for political anti-Semitism [was not] due to a rejection of the anti-
Semitic message as such, given that three-quarters of the total population were considered to maintain 
hostile, deprecatory, or at least unfavourable attitudes towards the Jews in Britain.' p. 34 
8 Bill Williams, 'The Anti-Semitism of Tolerance', in Alan J. Kidd and K.W. Roberts (eds.), City, Class 
and Culture: Studies of Social Policy and Cultural Production in Victorian Manchester (Manchester, 
1985), 74. Williams writes that the Jews had to ' live up to the ideals expected of them.', p 77 
9 George Orwell, ' Anti-Semitism in Britain' , Contemporary Jewish Record (April 1945), 384. also, 
Gisela Lebzelter argues that latent antisemitism was widespread in Britain during the interwar years. p. 
34 One contemporary writer wrote in hindsight: ' Antisemitsm was in the air: an unmistakable tang.' p 
218 in Holmes from the Thirties by Muggeridge 
10 for more on nineteenth century British anti-Semitism, see Colin Holmes. Antisemitism in British Society 
1876-1939 (New York, 1979) 
11 Kushner, p. 20 
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phenomena as the 'anti-Semitism of tolerance' . The subject of social anti-Semitism, or the 
'anti-Semitism of tolerance' is complicated by its ambiguity. Jews occasionally were 
victims of anti-Semitic violence in Britain but as a community, they enjoyed the same 
rights and privileges as any other minority group. Common attitudes towards Jews have 
b~en divided by Kushner into two main arguments. The first, a 'bifurcated' view, held that 
there were both 'good' Jews and 'bad' ones. Good Jews were seen as those who 
assimilated properly, were patriotic and honest. 'Bad' Jews were those who were not 
integrated, often foreign and financially exploitative. 
12 This representation found 
expression in the way individuals often described their own attitudes toward Jews. ' [The 
Jews] had better stop being Jews and start being human beings,' wrote George Bernard 
Shaw in 1933. 'I am not in favour of the Jews being a separate entity. They should 
assimilate with the rest of the people among whom they dwell.' 
13 The second perception 
held that anti-Semitism was a result of Jewish behavior. ' In a post-emancipatory society,' 
writes Kushner, 'anti-Semitism was deemed, ultimately, to be the fault of the Jews.' 
14 
This 'well-earned' anti-Semitism held that Jews made themselves conspicuous as a result 
of their behavior, particularly in their business dealings. George Orwell spoke about the 
hypocrisy inherent in British society where an individual usually felt anti-Semitism to be 
unacceptable but to dislike Jews was not unacceptable. 
15 
A 193 8 Mass-Observation poll taken on behalf of the Board of Deputies concluded 
that the extent of anti-Semitism in Britain was far-reaching. § 
12 ibid. , 36 
In this report we see the almost unanimous angle of these reports. Over and over 
again the Observer states that the area isn't anti-Semitic, goes on to show that 
secretly he or she is. And this is equally true of working class, middle class and 
upper class Observers, for all ages, sexes, areas, occupations, political views, 
educational standards. Many are ashamed of their covert hostility. Many who are 
13 quoted in the Jewish Chronicle, 3 February 1933 
14 Kushner, p. 55 
15 Orwell, p. 384 
§ The poll was taken by Torn Harrisson's Mass-Observation Center and conducted over a period of three 
months on over 2,000 people nationwide. The survey consulted individuals from all classes, sexes, ages, 
etc. The respondents remained anonymous but sometimes a description was added as to the level of their · 
education, their class or their political leaning . 
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openly pro-semitic, Communists, etc., nevertheless confess a secret contempt or 
dislike. 16 
The bifurcated view of Jews found many respondents commenting on their personal 
hostility to the concept of anti-Semitism but also expressing their own contempt for 
certain features about Jews, which they believed, characterized the entire community . 
Even the eminent statesman, Harold Nicolson expressed a somewhat contradictory view 
when he stated: 'The Jewish capacity for destruction is really illimitable. Although I loathe 
anti-Semitism, I do dislike Jews.' 
17 Jews were widely viewed as a monolithic community, 
well-organized and powerful. 'A sort of free-masonry exists between them (they are a 
very clannish race) [and] they always favour each other,' noted one Mass-Observation 
respondent. 18 Another respondent argued that 'As a race, they have always been fighting 
against the rest of the world and have done brilliantly.' 
19 Many respondents also 
expressed their dislike of the Jewish community as a whole, but not as individuals. 'I do 
not like the Jewish race as a whole,' wrote one typical respondent, 'though I have a few 
Jewish friends whom I like very much.' 
20 
This is not to say that the overwhelming majority of British people did not hold 
hostile views towards Nazi brutality. Those looking for answers to the policies of the 
Nazi regime often concluded that the Jewish community, perhaps, represented a cohesive 
threat against Nazism. The focus of many people was not so much on the policy of the 
Nazis but on the Jews and what they could possibly be doing to cause so much hatred. 
21 
The fact that Jews were often associated with financial dominance and conspiratorial 
monopolies confirmed for many the belief that certain measures might be necessary to help 
break-up any unfair Jewish control. One prominent merchant banker noted: 'Hitler's 
handling of the Jewish question has[ ... ] been his greatest mistake. That he was justified in 
reducing the Jewish control in certain trades and professions even the best Jews in 
16 Mass-Observation Archive, University of Sussex, Falmer (hereafter MOA), File Al 2, December 1938: 
Anti-Semitism Survey 
17 quoted from Nicolson Diaries in Lebzelter, p. 34 
18 MOA, files 40-79, respondent was described as a 'very ordinary man ' 
19 ibid. , no description for the respondent 
20 ibid. 
21 Kushner, 36 
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Germany themselves admit, but it should have been done in a very different way. There 
was no need to insult the whole Jewish race.' 
22 The belief went that if the Jewish 
community dominated particular economic spheres, then it was not unreasonable for the 
German government to intervene. The violent methods employed by the Nazi regime 
were widely misunderstood and the impression, among the British public, was that like any 
'responsible' government, the German government was attempting to 'clean-up' the 
market in order to create a level economic playing field. If the Jews were to dominate 
industry in Britain as they did in Germany, argued a Mass-Observation respondent, 'we 
will rise against the Jews on our own account and kick them out of the country.' 
23 
The perception of Jews as a powerfol community had significant implications on 
the way the German anti-Jewish crisis was understood throughout Britain. For most 
people in Britain, the humanitarian crisis in Germany was not a priority. The anti-Jewish 
persecution did not find a particularly receptive response from the British public largely 
because of the complexity of the German situation and partly, because of their own 
lingering perceptions of Jews. Any representation of Jews as innocent and defenseless 
victims contrasted with the view, in Britain, of Jewish power and wealth.
24 The 
association between anti-Semitism in Germany and the increasing exclusion of Jews in 
German society was perceived as one emerging from an economic backlash, and by 
extension a political one. It was common to draw associations between Jews and financial 
power or exploitation. Many pulp novels of the time featured a character of Jewish 
descent who was invariably involved in a financial racket. 
25 Winston Churchill asked a 
friend of Hitler's in 1932: 'Why is your chief so violent about the Jews? I can quite 
understand being angry with the Jews who have done wrong or are against the country, 
and I understand resisting them if they try to monopolize power in any walk of life; but 
what is the sense of being against a man simply because of his birth? How can a man help 
how he is born?' 26 Churchill's sentiments were widely shared by the majority of people in 
22 quoted from Ernest Tennant journal entry, June 1934 in Kushner, 39 
23 MOA, files 40-79 
24 Kushner, p. 40 
25 Holmes, pp. 212-13 
26 quoted in Kushner, 37 
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Britain and this view enabled the average individual to go so far in trying to 'make sense 
out of Germany's repressive measures without agreeing with them. This line of reasoning 
often found people expressing their own intolerance along with an opposition toward 
violent persecution and even anti-Semitism. After Kristallnacht, Prime Minister Neville 
Chamberlain wrote: 'No doubt Jews aren't a lovable people; I don't care for them myself 
but that is not sufficient to explain the pogrom.' 
27 Just as the respondents in the Mass-
Observation poll expressed sentiments hostile to the Jewish community as a group, many 
also viewed the anti-Jewish persecution in a similar manner. ' I don't mind the thought of 
the Jews being persecuted as a race,' wrote one respondent, 'but I do mind when I think 
of them as individuals.' 28 
The sentiment of the average person expressed toward Jews, as discussed, was 
both highly complex and highly contradictory. The only tangible conclusion that can be 
reached relies on an ambiguity of sentiment. The conclusion, therefore, points to a Britain 
which, at its best, was ambivalent toward, sometimes sympathetic and lacked an 
understanding of the plight of the German-Jewish community and, at its worst, wholly 
unsympathetic. On a humanitarian level, most people opposed violence and persecution 
but when considered alongside the social circumstances of 1930s Britain, most people 
believed the German anti-Jewish situation to be of no consequence to Britain. Public 
attitudes penneated institutional ones and fostered a culture in which the problems of the 
German-Jewish community failed to inspire widespread sympathy. The development of 
this culture was rooted partly in misunderstanding and partly in the social anti-Semitism of 
British society. This was the culture in which the BBC operated . 
II. Assessing early examples of persecution 
Like other major upheavals happening across Europe, many within the Talks 
department of the BBC saw the political situation in Germany as one which inaugurated a 
27 
ibid. ' 55 
28 MOA, files 40-79, respondent described as the daughter of left-wing writer Naomi Mitchison 
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fundamental shift towards order and renewal. For most broadcasters, the event was a 
'revolution', the beginning of Germany's social and political rebirth. In 1933, it was 
difficult to comprehend the full consequences of this 'revolution', particularly in regard to 
the German-Jewish population. There was no specific staff policy developed on how to 
handle news regarding Germany and only vague standards to determine how to cover 
foreign affairs, careful at the very least not to offend foreign countries. When it came to 
German affairs, the BBC was naturally (and overwhelmingly) concerned with the issues of 
disarmament and rearmament, hostility toward the League of Nations and, by the middle 
of the decade, Germany's renewed sense of militarism and the potential for war. Other 
defining features of the Nazi regime, like the worship of race and the elevation of anti-
Semitism to a state-sponsored policy, were treated with less resolve by the Talks 
department. What modern historians consider 'major' watersheds in relation to the Jewish 
situation under the Nazi regime were given no more than a cursory mention. After the 
infamous Nuremberg laws were passed, disenfranchising all Jews in Germany, the BBC 
carried the following report: 'Herr Hitler's speech in the Reichstag on September 15 
caused great excitement both in Germany and abroad. The first part dealt with new 
internal legislation: the substituting of the swastika flag for the old Imperial colors, and 
further laws governing the status of the Jews. The second part raised the question of 
Memel.' 29 No details of the anti-Jewish measures were given in this report nor was this 
watershed considered nearly as substantive as the Memel issue, to which the rest of the 
brief report was devoted . 
It is perhaps no surprise that the BBC offered no greater analysis or closer 
scrutiny. The BBC could neither comprehend the full implications of these events nor 
their repercussions. To grasp the complexity of German racialism posed an elusive task 
for any foreign contemporary witness. · Indeed it is only comparatively recently that 
historians have been able to analyze and understand the elevation of race as the single 
most powerful element in the Nazi regime. 
30 There were a fair few press and Foreign 
Office reports in the 1930s which touched on the issue of race totality but these were brief 
29 BBC Scripts, News Bulletin, 15 September 1935 
30 see Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann, The Racial State: Germany 1933-1945, (Cambridge, · 
199 1) 
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flashes of insight which rarely made their way into broadcasts. 
31 But what of the issue of 
basic human rights? To what extent did the Corporation underestimate the real events of 
widespread public repression and persecution in their broadcasts? 
Andrew Sharfs book on the British Press and the Jews living under the Nazi 
regime presents a similar problem confronted by historians. To what extent can the 
historian estimate the level of understanding which contemporaries contained of the 
deeper crisis? It is almost certain that any contemporary analysis could be no more than a 
superficial one. Nazi Germany inaugurated a political revolution and for the most part, its 
various features were seen as a result of this 'revolution'. It was not uncommon for 
broadcasters to share the presumed consternation of their listeners by expressing disbelief 
with some of the more odd features of the 'revolutionary' regime. ' I am not exaggerating 
when I say that National Socialism is to many as inspiring as a sudden discovery of 
religion' went one report. 
32 Sharf, however, is not particularly concerned with this 
question. His account focuses on the Nazi regime as an isolated historical period, one 
which contained a few basic and even obvious features. The first one was violence. 
33 In 
virtually all contemporary accounts dealing with political repression under Nazism, 
broadcasters ( and in Sharf s case, journalists) alluded to some form of violence associated 
with the particular event. An early BBC account of the anti-Jewish activity described the 
1 April boycott of 1933: 'Two days [ago] there was this Nazi boycott, and you may care 
to hear from me about it. I spent the whole day in the streets, and although the sight of a 
bunch of Nazis bullying people into closing their shops at one time made me so angry that 
I nearly got myself arrested.' 
34 Newspaper accounts of the boycott ran headlines such as 
'Eyewitness Tells of Jew Baiting Tragedies, Nazi Mob Lynch Lawyer' and 'Hitler's War 
31 One broadcast noted: 'Every German is to serve the group idol which in the case of Nazi Germany is 
the racial folk. The racial folk conception which has now swept over them [the German people] with the 
cosmic force of a new religion [ ... ] It [the racial folk conception] excludes Jews from the racial group, 
from the folk community, on the grounds that they belong to another race, a non-Aryan race, as the Nazis 
put it. ' BBC Scripts, H. Powys Greenwood, 'Freedom and Authority in the modern world: The race-idol 
of Nazi Germany', 27 February 1935 
32 BBC Scripts, Vernon Bartlett, ' What I have seen in Nazi Germany' , 30 March 1933 
33 Sharf writes: 'Readers of any British newspaper were left in no doubt that violence directed against 
certain groups of people was an integral part of the new Germany' . The British Press and Jews Under 
Nazi Rule, p. 74 
34 BBC Scripts, Vernon Bartlett, 'The week abroad: Poland rejuvenated', 6 April 1933 . 
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on Judea. Berlin Lawyer said to have been Lynched' . 
35 Other press accounts of Nazi 
violence contained vivid details. The Manchester Guardian wrote some days after the 1 
April boycott: 
A few days ago a man was sentenced to a year's imprisonment for spreading the 
' false rumour' that a Jew had been hanged by Brown shirts - the ' rumour' , as a 
matter of fact, was true: the Jew[ ... ] was beaten by Brown Shirts and hanged by 
his feet, so that his head was suspended off the ground. When the Brown Shirts 
had finished with him he was dead. 
36 
The second obvious feature was the suspension of dissenting views. Broadcasters 
and journalists were aware of the extent of state control over individuals and constantly 
reiterated the restrictions placed on free expression. From the outset, reports dealing with 
the social conditions under the Nazi regime made it clear to both the listening and reading 
public that the state reserved the power to intrude on the private lives of individuals and 
monopolize state resources to cany out their aims. The tone of most of these reports 
implied the dubious virtue of this officially-sanctioned power. One BBC account noted: 
The Government parties alone were allowed to use wireless for electioneering 
purposes, [and] any claim that last Sunday's ballot gave an honest expression of 
public opinion will be looked upon with some suspicion. 
The decree issued last week suspending all the articles of the constitution relating 
to liberty of the individual and of the Press must increase the resentment of 
Munich and other state capitals against Berlin. Letters can now be opened, houses 
can be searched at will, and the government of any Federal State which does not 
carry out the decree with sufficient severity can be turned out of office. 
37 
Neither the Corporation nor press publications had to understand the nuances and subtle 
undertones of the 'racial state' in order to discuss the very real face of Nazi violence. In a 
liberal society like Britain, political, social and religious repression was seen as a very 
undemocratic feature of any society, particularly one like Germany which underwent a 
rapid transformation from a liberal-style political democracy into a totalitarian regime . 
Although many contemporary broadcast reports accounted for the expected repercussions 
of revolution, ('For years the Nazis have been taught to hate the Jews and the Socialists; it 
35 Sharf, p. 74. The first headline is from the Daily Herald of 3 April 1933 and the second from the News 
of the World of the same date . 
36 Manchester Guardian article of8 April 1933 in Gilbert, Exile and Return, p. 158. 
37 BBC Scripts, Vernon Bartlett, 'The world and ourselves: critical days in Germany', 8 March 1933 
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would be unreasonable to expect that hatred to die down the moment they came into 
power [ ... ] And this ~ [BBC's underline] a revolution') accounts of anti-Jewish 
persecution, as we shall see, were generally broadcast without detail and in the same 
context as political repression throughout the interwar 1930s. 
38 
To present a fair treatment on this subject, and determine the broadcast priority 
given to the anti-Jewish persecution, a certain amount of comparative information - stories 
dealing with German issues unrelated to anti-Semitism - must be discussed. Between (and 
including) January 1933 and December 1938, anti-Semitism or Jews were discussed or 
very briefly mentioned in at least forty broadcasts of either talks, news briefs, reviews or 
topical features not necessarily relating to Germany. By contrast, questions and issues 
relating solely to Germany featured in at least one-hundred features per annum, almost 
seventeen times as many as features on Jews, whether they involved German anti-
Semitism or simply Jewish composers. t What is most compelling about BBC coverage 
was the way in which it presented facts and how those who reported these facts 
interpreted the anti-Jewish persecution. Virtually all reports on the Jewish question in 
Germany were concerned with either 'racial' questions or 'political' repression . 
The BBC's first major attempt to report on the new regime in Germany came in 
the early part of 193 3 with a series of broadcasts commissioned by Siepmann' s Talks 
department, to be given by Vernon Bartlett, a respected journalist and former official at 
the League of Nations. Bartlett's opportunity to 'microphone round Europe' inaugurated 
a major innovation in the Corporation's foreign news coverage for until this time few 
broadcasts dealing with foreign affairs were delivered from remote locations. His earliest 
accounts of the Nazi regime set the tone for future broadcasts relating to both Germany 
and the Jewish situation in Germany. The British public were reassured about Hitler's 
radicalism over the airwaves for the first time in February 1933 when Bartlett declared, 'It 
is probably a good thing that Herr Hitler now has his chance [ ... ] Many of his speeches on 
foreign affairs have created a lot of uneasiness and alarm [ ... but] there is nothing like 
38 BBC Scripts, Bartlett, ' What I have seen ... ' 
1 These statistics are based on the broadcasts printed in the Listener between 1933 and 1938. It should be · 
noted that the majority of ' talks ' were published in the Listener . 
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responsibility for taking revolution out of a man.' 
39 This analysis of Hitler's appointment 
to the Chancellorship brought to home audiences a keen, first-hand account of the events 
taking place in Germany, the first reports the British listening public would hear . 
The early broadcasts were interpreted solely from Bartlett's point of view as he 
was the only broadcaster dealing with German issues. For most listeners, the information 
they received was a mixed bag of positive renewal, revolutionary violence and the 
imposition of order. 'The tendency of those at present in power in Germany,' Bartlett said 
in one report 'is to claim that they have the monopoly on patriotism and that others must 
be compelled to their conception of it by force .' 
40 He called the persecution of the Jews 
'unnecessary' but implied its emergence as a by-product of revolution, a revolution 
'inevitable towards the recovery of German greatness and influence.' 
41 
When the state 'gave its blessing' to an official Nazi boycott of Jewish-owned 
shops in late March 1933, Bartlett described briefly, the Jewish condition in Germany for 
the first time. 42 'Many doctors, lawyers, artists and civil servants, and so on have been 
dismissed in the last few weeks for their political opinions or for their Jewish race. There is 
the threat of a complete anti-Jewish boycott, to start on Saturday, the result of which 
nobody can foresee.' 43 While Bartlett made it clear that anti-Jewish persecution existed, 
he left it unclear as to whether this was a state policy or the spontaneous action of the 
non-Jewish population. The British Embassy in Berlin, at the same time, warned of the 
potential implications of the boycott: 'The imposition of further disabilities on the Jews 
must therefore be anticipated, for it is certainly Hitler's intention to degrade and, if 
possible, expel the Jewish community from Germany ultimately.' 
44 Bartlett's assessment, 
by contrast, went to great lengths to enunciate the moderation of anti-Jewish actions and 
39 BBC Scripts, Vernon Bartlett, 'Crises in three countries' , 8 February 1933 
40 BBC Scripts, Vernon Bartlett, 'Critical days in Germany' 
41 BBC Scripts, Vernon Bartlett, 'What I have seen in the New Germany' , 30 March 1933 
42 Noakes and Pridham, p. 461. The authors write: 'At the end of March [1933 .. . ] the Government gave 
its blessing to an official Party boycott of Jewish shops in retaliation for the campaign abroad against Nazi 
atrocities.' 
43 BBC Scripts, Bartlett, 'What I have seen." . .' 
44 PRO F0/371/16722 1933, dispatch from Sir Horace Rumbold, British ambassador to Germany, to the 
Foreign Office, April 1933 
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the atmosphere of normality in Germany despite his previous reports indicating the far-
reaching reverberations of the revolution: 
The persecution, I am firmly convinced, is not nearly so bad as many people in 
other countries believe. These exaggerated ideas have grown up abroad partly 
because a few people will believe anything they want to believe, partly because the 
suppression of the opposition press makes it difficult to check the truth of 
rumours, and partly because newspaper correspondents cannot be expected to 
remind us every time they refer to a case of persecution that the population of 
Germany is over sixty-five million, the very great majority of whom are living 
their normal lives [ ... ] the government have now taken such strong measures to 
prevent persecutions that there should be no further excuse for false rumours.
45 
What the listener was left with was a fairly bland assessment of events and no contextual 
information. The policy of anti-Semitism, which became an official state policy with 
Hitler's emergence as Chancellor, was presented as an attitude monopolized by peripheral 
figures . 46 By comparison, press accounts described the event as a 'silent pogrom' with 
one daily arguing that 'violent anti-Semitism is one of the few clear-cut and unmistakable 
features of the Nazi outlook.' 47
 The fact that any boycott directed toward a specific 
community in Germany was not analyzed as a somewhat bizarre incident represented, as 
we shall see, the BBC's common approach to the events taking place in Germany. Sharf 
notes that although the facts were available to any press correspondent, the majority of 
press officials preferred to 'minimize, qualify, or speculate according to their several 
bents.' 48 Bartlett's feature, indeed, stressed the 'orderly, well-disciplined and not too ill-
humoured,' features of the boycott. 
49 These early broadcasts, and subsequent ones 
dealing with anti-Jewish persecution were to prove often superficial. 
The election of the National Socialists, as mentioned above, was not viewed with 
immediate alarm within the Talks department. For many presenters, the 'new Germany' -
as it so often was described - represented the return of order and stability to Germany . 
While most of these broadcasters might be personally opposed to this specific kind of 
45 BBC Scripts, Bartlett, 'What I have seen ... ' 
46 Noakes and Pridham, 460. The authors write: 'When Hitler came to power in 1933, the antisemitic 
aims of the NSDAP became official policy.' 
47 Sharf. The British Press and Jews Under Nazi Rule, p. 31. The first quote is from the Manchester 
Guardian of l April 1933; the second is from the Leeds Mercury of27 March 1933. 
48 Sharf, p. 32. 
49 BBC Scripts, Bartlett, ' What I have seen ... ' 
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government, many of them were convinced that it was a perfectly sound policy for 
Germany. This reasoning enabled a reporter to express personal indignation toward 
Germany's anti-Jewish policy but also to highlight the positive changes inaugurated by the 
Nazi government. The practice of counter-balancing a negative portrayal of the regime 
with an equally positive one reflected the Corporation's obsession with objectivity. If the 
BBC had carved out a role for radio in the 1930s, it was to use the wireless as an object to 
advance mutual understanding. So while one reporter would make 'no attempt to defend 
Germany's anti-Jew policy' he could also express a belief in the need for 'a greater 
attempt in this country to understand the German point of view.' 
50 The listener, 
therefore, while aware of the reporter's personal hostility toward the anti-Jewish policy 
was left with the impression that there was another, equally rational case to be made for 
another perspective. 'Remember we are watching the rebirth of a nation,' went one report 
' a nation which has suffered greatly and is trying to evolve a new kind of civilisation.' 
51 
While on the one hand Germany's strange anti-Jewish policy seemed an aberration, 
listeners were reassured that the German Reich was making positive strides toward self-
improvement and this was laudable . 
m. Interpreting persecution 
When it came to interpreting the Jewish situation in the context of German 
'renewal', the BBC believed it to be a by-product of political circumstances and not one of 
overt hatred. The Jewish condition was seen largely as a political problem and thus, acts 
of anti-Jewish persecution were given a broadcast treatment much in the same way as anti-
Socialist and anti-Communist repression. While reports rarely called anti-Jewish 
persecution 'political', the characterization was implicit by describing the Jewish situation 
in the same breath as 'political' opposition. There were few reports detailing violent 
persecution and no single talk focused solely on the anti-Jewish persecution between 1933 
50 BBC Scripts, Sir Evelyn Wrench, 'The week abroad: Roosevelt and Hitler', 18 May 1933 
51 BBC Scripts, Sir Evelyn Wrench, 'What Germany was thinking last week', 10 April 1933 . 
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and 1938. In fact anti-Jewish persecution rarely was mentioned together with violence 
and there was no attempt to confront the social implications of persecution on the Jewish 
community. When describing the anti-Jewish boycott, for example, one reporter intimated 
that the repercussions of the boycott were wholly economic. 
52 Broadcasts implied that 
the Jewish community were only victims of economic and legal restrictions. In general, 
analysis of the anti-Jewish crisis failed to address the social repercussions of legal 
restrictions - the social marginalization of the community. This is not to say that the 
condition of the Jews in Germany was addressed at all. But the manner in which it was 
dealt with failed to give the whole picture of events ( especially in comparison to accounts 
in certain sectors of the printed press like the Manchester Guardian). The tendency at 
Broadcasting House was to focus on issues deemed to be more important in relation to 
Germany. Few stories, overall among those dedicated to events in Germany, dealt with 
persecution of any kind. When topics relating to the persecution were discussed, there 
were three common approaches in presenting the information. Firstly, that Jews 
comprised a 'political' minority and thus, were victims of 'political' repression. Second, 
the approach implied that the Jewish community was partially responsible for inciting 
racial anti-Semitism as a result of their behavior. The third approach drew an implied 
distinction between victims of 'innocent' persecution (anti-Church/ anti-Christian 
persecution) and those who were victims as a result of their 'political' hostility toward the 
state (Jews, Communists, Socialists, Internationalists). 
53 
Many talks attempting to tackle the issue of state-sponsored repression left the 
listener with the impression that perhaps political repression was necessary to encourage 
stability in a time of crisis. What was not made clear, however, was the fact that Jews 
were not political enemies of the state but victims of racial anti-Semitism. 'What we hate 
is the way you can't tolerate anyone whose opinions differ from yours. The Jews, for 
example' argued one panelist on a youth 'cultural exchange' broadcast between British 
and German representatives. 'There may have been a Jewish problem, but yours is a fine 
52 BBC Scripts, Bartlett, 'Poland rejuvenated' . The reporter notes: 'The damage done to the Jews by the 
boycott is terrific. ' 
53 Bartlett described the 'unnecessary persecution of Jews, Socialists, Liberals and Internationalists.' in 
BBC Scripts, Bartlett, ' What I have seen .. . ' 
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way of solving it' he goes on to argue. 
54 This panelist had altruistic motives in 
denouncing the anti-Jewish persecution but his argument implied that the Jews constituted 
a political minority, people 'whose opinions differ' . He also acknowledged the existence 
of a 'Jewish problem' and implied that it was a matter which justifiably could be solved, 
but not by repressive and violent means. Other BBC contributors alluded to a 'Jewish 
problem' but almost never expanded on the definition of this 'problem' . 'I am not 
ignorant of the case against the Jews in Germany' went one broadcast. 'I am not ignorant 
of the fact that there is a Jew problem in Germany. '
55 Indeed it was common to attack 
Nazi repression of 'Jews [ ... ] and all those who do not see eye to eye with them [the 
Nazis]' but this too left the listener with the impression that the Jews perhaps represented 
a ' political' interest in Germany and posed a threat to the state. 
56 'The Nazis have made 
the Jews, with the Social Democrats and the Communists, the scapegoat for all the 
miseries which led to the Revolution and their exclusion the symbol of the new unity and 
hope,' went another broadcast. 
57 
The second approach to coverage of anti-Jewish persecution often implied that 
Jews might be partially responsible for inspiring anti-Semitism. The Corporation implicitly 
bought into the belief that Jewish behavior was perhaps, at the heart of anti-Semitism . 
When Jewish issues were discussed, whether they related to Germany or not, the tone of 
the talks often implied this very idea. Often these broadcasts drew unconscious 
associations between racial stereotypes and anti-Semitic persecution. Like the 
characterization of Jews as a 'political' opposition, there was never an account stating 
overtly that Jews caused anti-Semitism. To draw a connection between Jewish behavior 
and anti-Jewish persecution was, after all, an anti-Semitic claim. 'The Jews have always 
been disliked for various reasons' went one report, 'some comprehensible, some not, and 
they were unpopular in Germany after the War. '
58 The . distinction drawn between 
'comprehensible' anti-Semitism and 'incomprehensible' anti-Semitism intimated that anti-
54 BBC Scripts, Ferdinand Winkel and Stephen Taylor, ' European Exchange I: Germany', 4 December 
1935 
55 BBC Scripts, John Hilton, 'More About Germany', 1 July 1936 
56 BBC Scripts, John Hilton, 'Blunders in Berlin' 
57 BBC Scripts, Powys Greenwood, 'Race-Idol...' 
58 BBC Scripts, Powys Greenwood, 'Freedom and Authority ... ' 
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Semitism could be comprehended and even rationalized. If anti-Semitism could be 
'comprehensible' under certain circumstances, then by extension, so could anti-Semitic 
persecution. In Britain, it was not seen as contradictory to view oneself as 'tolerant' but 
at the same time anti-Semitic. 'The late Vincent d'Indy,' went one broadcast, 'was an 
anti-Semite of the gentle and tolerant type.' 
59 It was common for broadcasts dealing with 
anti-Jewish persecution to recognize the existence of anti-Jewish feeling and to imply that 
it was not unacceptable behavior, unlike persecution, which was. ' Some people like the 
Jews,' went one broadcast, 'Some dislike them. Yet nobody with any claim to ordinary 
decency of sentiment [can] repress indignation at persecution of this kind.' 
60 The 
implication was that one could 'dislike Jews' but still ' claim to ordinary decency' by 
denouncing the persecution. It was also not uncommon to mention the Jewish origins .of 
controversial figures discussed over the air. These descriptions often had the effect of 
further strengthening stereotypes equating Jews with Communism, money or power. 'The 
latest of the great Jewish prophets, a gentleman named Marx' said George Bernard Shaw 
in a broadcast on Freedom in 1935. 
61 At a time when the political stratification between 
left and right reached a head, Shaw's comment was most certainly, unwelcome . 
It was common to view the Jewish community as a distinctive racial group in 
Britain and while this did not imply hostility toward Jews, there were subtle associations 
drawn between Jews and 'racial characteristics' . Harold Nicolson in a broadcast 
describing his opposition to Zionism reflected that 'the Jews were not an agricultural 
race.' 62 Often broadcasters would express admiration for the seemingly 'amazing 
persistence [with which] the Jews have retained their racial character and their religious 
ritual.' 63 But this 'racial character' was defined in a number of ways from one 
broadcaster's reference to the 'famous, though not unmistakable, Jewish nose' to more 
nebulous distinctions like their 'tendency to exuberant intensity which one might call 
Jewish' . 64 Because of these distinct and what were often viewed as enviable 'racial' 
59 BBC Scripts, Edwin Evans, ' A Jewish Nationalist in Music', 18 November 1936 
60 BBC Scripts, H. Wickham Steed, ' World Affairs ', 22 June 1938 
61 BBC Scripts, George Bernard Shaw, 'Freedom', 26 June 1935 
62 BBC Scripts, Harold Nicolson, 'This past week', 11 July 1938 
63 BBC Scripts, Harry Nevinson, 'The Chosen People, a review' , 13 May 1936 
64 BBC Scripts, Edwin Evans, ' A Jewish nationalist in music', 18 November 1936 
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qualities, subtle observations of a 'very obvious Jew' or their 'inherited [ .. . ] cleverness' 
contributed to a belief, among the listening public, that Jews made up a separate, 
distinctive and perhaps powerful community in Germany. 
65 When commenting on the 
Jewish situation in Germany, one presenter noted how 'they have resisted absorption into 
the general mass of the population for hundreds of years.' 
66 
The inclusion of subtle remarks and suggestive phrases lent credibility to the 
associations between Jewish power and wealth. There was a tendency among 
broadcasters to discuss Jews and finance in the same report, sometimes alluding to 'big 
Jewish capitalists and financiers'. 
67 It was not uncommon, also, to remark that the Jews 
had a particular 'cleverness, especially in finance [where] they possess a special vitality.' 
68 One contemporary observer, describing the events of a Nuremberg rally noted: ' One 
could see big Jewish shops - especially jewelers - closed and protected with grills. Not all 
Jews were out of business during this week of Nazi celebration. One of the largest banks 
in the main street was carrying on as usual, and an enquiry over the counter elicited the 
reply that it was still controlled by two Jewish brothers.' 
69 When analyzing a speech 
given by Hitler, one broadcaster failed to repudiate the claims of a 'conspiracy between 
critics, artists and art dealers (all Jews) against the moneyed bourgeoisie' and offered no 
commentary on the implications of the statement. Terms such as 'control', 'financiers' or 
'racketeers', further, often entered into the lexicon of these reports dealing with Jews and 
the anti-Jewish crisis. While those broadcasting the events became aware of the brutality 
of persecution, they seem to have inferred that one kind of persecution was worse than the 
other. 
The third approach, then, drew an implied distinction between the '.innocent' 
persecution of the Christians, and the 'political' persecution of the Jews. While there was 
never a report which drew overt distinctions between anti-Jewish persecution and anti-
Christian persecution, the latter, by implication, was presented as a form of 'innocent' 
65 BBC Scripts, Bartlett, 'Indignation' and Nevinson, 'Chosen People' 
66 BBC Scripts, A.S. Russell, 'Racial problems in Europe', 13 November 1935 
67 BBC Scripts, R.W. Seton-Watson, ' What is happening in Central Europe?', 2 February 1938 
68 BBC Scripts, Nevinson, ' Chosen People' 
69 BBC Scripts, 'Spectacle at Nuremberg: English Visitors Impressions of the Congress of the Nazi Party\ 
30 September 1936 
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persecution m comparison to other forms of persecution. 'All secular opposition in 
Germany has now been quelled,' went one report. 'All that remains is the opposition of 
the Christian Churches - an opposition that is purely spiritual and [has] nothing to do with 
politics.' 70 Another broadcast noted, 'The [church] opposition has never been a political 
opposition' . 71 Unlike other accounts dealing with repression, a few BBC reports dealing 
with the issue of persecution dealt solely with the Church crisis in Germany. Anti-
Christian violence, in comparison to other forms, was characterized as 'inhuman' and the 
situation for confessional Christians, implied many of these reports, was far worse than 
that of others in Germany. 72 One report noted: 'Julius Streicher, Germany's leading anti-
Semite is proclaiming the menace of the Jew [ ... ] The Hymn of Hate against Jewry was 
sung also in Munich, but anti-Catholic demonstrators were more prominent and more 
violent.' 73 When the BBC ran appeals for refugees, furthermore, they were made, for 
obvious reasons, to the Christian consciences of the listeners. ' It cannot be too strongly 
stressed,' went one appeal (after briefly describing the plight of the Jews) 'that among 
these victims are large numbers of persons of the Christian faith, born and bred Christians, 
who because of one Jewish parent or grandparent are classed as non-Aryans and suffer the 
same humiliation and deprivation which is afflicting those who profess the religion of 
Judaism.' 74 While Christian churches underwent a process of ' coercion and corruption' 
under the Nazi regime, the BBC failed to highlight the destruction of Jewish institutions. 
75 
If the regime failed to 'coerce and corrupt' Christian institutions, broadcasters gave 
prominence to what seemed like the only brave resistance to the Nazi regime. 'The 
Christian churches are now hard pressed as the last remnants of independent thought,' 
went one broadcast. 76 These implied distinctions drawn between Jews and others 
reflected the Corporation's lack of understanding regarding the Jewish community. There 
70 BBC Scripts, F.A. Voight, 'The German Purge' , 7 February 1938 
71 BBC WAC, Richard Crossman contributor file, Richard Crossman, 'The Church Conflict in Germany ', 
4 September 1934 
72 BBC Scripts, F.A. Voight, 'The German Church dispute', 12 April 1937 
73 PRO F0/371/18862 1935, BBC Bulletin broadcast on 15 August 1935 
74 BBC Scripts, ' A World' s Good Cause: An Appeal for Jews and Non-Aryan Christians' , 8 December 
1938 
75 BBC Scripts, F.A. Voight, ' Church Dispute' 
76 BBC Scripts, W.G.J. Knop, 'Five Years of Nazi Rule in Germany' , 31 January 1938 
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were no Jews involved in the executive decision-making processes of the BBC and the 
impact of the Anglo-Jewish community on BBC broadcast output was minimal. The next 
section shall examine this last point more closely . 
IV. Anglo-Jewry and broadcast appeals 
The BBC's relationship with the Anglo-Jewish community is somewhat more 
tenuous a topic than the Corporation's broadcast coverage of Germany. There were 
obvious reasons why Anglo-Jewry took a keen interest in broadcasting. Their first priority 
was to see Jews portrayed positively in BBC broadcasts. The instability of the 1930s and 
the rise of fascist movements in Britain lent credence to their belief in the rise of anti-
Semitism. The Board of Deputies, Anglo-Jewry's representative body in Britain, believed 
that negative or stereotypical portrayals of Jews on the air might strengthen existing 
misperceptions of Jews. The Anglo-Jewish community was also concerned about their co-
religionists in Germany and how the Corporation and other news providers interpreted 
anti-Jewish persecution. 77
 The second was that while Anglo-Jewish representatives 
sought to make light of the anti-Jewish persecution, they were quick to realize that any 
representations or reports dealing with Jews, whether negative, positive or simply 
informative, might only help to exacerbate anti-Semitism. 
78 The BBC also held the belief 
that the cause of anti-Semites might be strengthened by giving too much publicity to 
Jewish issues and offered this as a reason for avoiding specifically 'Jewish content' . The 
Board did not want to appear 'pushy' by putting pressure on the Corporation to focus 
77 One member of the Jewish community sent the BBC the following letter after hearing the Corporation's 
broadcast account ofKristallnacht: 'Your[ ... ] broadcast not only failed in the negative way to give 
information that it was desirable for German listeners to have but actually went wrong positively by 
conveying an erroneous impression of the re-action outside Germany to recent events in that country.' 
Board of Deputies of British Jews Archive (hereafter BDBJ) ACC/312 l/E2/035, unidentified letter to 
Reith. 14 November 1938 
78 Sidney Saloman of the Board wrote to Charles Brewer of the entertainment department: ' Anything[ ... ] 
which may tend to exacerbate the present situation [of anti-Semitism] should be avoided[ ... ] It takes so 
little. nowadays to weigh the balance between like and dislike of the Jew.' BBC WAC R34/789/ll Policy: 
Religion: Jewish Programmes 1938-43, Saloman to Brewer on the maintenance of Jewish programmes, · 
30 October 1938 
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more news content on the situation in Germany. This course of action, Board 
representatives believed, would reflect poorly on the Jewish community . 
John Reith's BBC was no bastion of Jewish representation. Indeed what Jewish 
representation there was within the Corporation remained at the lowest levels. The 
Director-General, who enforced a strict Sunday broadcast policy and was himself a devout 
Presbyterian, had been known to ask prospective employees if they accepted the 
'fundamental teachings of Jesus Christ' before accepting them for employment. 
79 The 
Corporation, in the 1930s, reserved an average of six percent of broadcast time to 
religious programming, of an exclusively Christian content. 
80 'The BBC confines itself to 
broadcasting the Christian religion and therefore excludes Unitarianism, Judaism, 
Mohammedonism and many other respectable religious creeds of the world,' stated a 
Radio Times editorial in 1933. 
81 One program claiming Christianity to be the answer to 
the woes of the world elicited an angry editorial in the Jewish Chronicle. 'Wireless need 
not be made a proselytiser. But the time has come for fairness to all Faiths. We must 
emancipate the air.' 82 The feeling among Jewish representatives, however, was that as 
long as they functioned within the framework of a Christian society, their only recourse 
was to monitor religious broadcasts rather than to push aggressively for Jewish religious 
programs. The Board lodged frequent complaints with the Corporation against programs 
deemed offensive to the community. In one religious broadcast, the Reverend T.H. 
Tardrew in his sermon stated that 'the Jews killed Jesus Christ'. 
83 The secretary to the 
Board of Deputies protested to Reith on the grounds that 'a statement so prejudicial to the 
Jewish community should have been broadcast'. 
84 The Board feared that broadcasts of 
this type had the 'effect of exacerbating differences and of stimulating biblical disputes on 
issues very remote from present day problems' . 
85 When the Board did make a rare 
79 McIntyre, p. 189 
8
~ Briggs, vol. II, p. 52. Christian broadcasts included denominational broadcasts . 
81 Quoted in the Jewish Chronicle, 20 January 1933 
82 Jewish Chronicle, 20 January 1933 
83 BDBJ ACC/3121/E2/035, letter from the secretary of the Board of Deputies to Reith, April 1936. The 
original text ofTardrew's sermon does not survive but is quoted at length in an internal Board of Deputies 
memorandum. 
84 ibid., Board of Deputies 
85 ibid. , 
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request for Jewish religious programming, like a broadcast by the Chief Rabbi J.A. Hertz 
on the festival of Purim in 1938, Richard Maconachie, then director of the Talks 
department, argued a program of this kind, at this moment in time 'leaves me very cold' . 
86 
The Board believed that by discussing Jewish festivals, a more subtle form of pro-Jewish 
sympathy might be aroused. It was not, most likely, the religious nature of the broadcast 
Maconachie objected to, but its presumed 'political' undertones. 
Talks on topics of Jewish interest were handled delicately because they were seen 
often as constituting 'political' programming. 'As a matter of face we seldom, if ever, 
undertake programmes, however short, of exclusively Jewish material,' wrote the Variety 
director in 1935. 87 The Corporation had a fairly strict policy on 'political' content and 
feared that specifically Jewish programming 'would invariably be regarded as having 
pointed direction to Germany' . 
88 On a proposed music concert by contemporary Jewish 
composers, one executive asked: 'Would you recommend us to ask the Colonial Office 
whether they think it expedient for the BBC to put on a programme of such character in 
the present state of affairs? It might be better to keep the idea in reserve until the Palestine 
problem has been at least partly solved.' 
89 A handwritten note at the bottom of the 
memorandum stated: 'C.P. (controller of programmes) feels that the time is not ripe for a 
Jewish programme of this kind to be broadcast. Art is international, we know, but there is 
no strong positive reason for putting on the programme at this moment and a fairly strong 
negative one against doing it.' 
90 Another proposal, in 1938, for a program on the history 
of Anglo-Jewry given by the Reverend James Parkes was tabled indefinitely for fear that 
'the result would not[ ... ] be either to increase international goodwill, or to help the Jewish 
86 BBC WAC R34/789/l Policy: Religion: Jewish Programmes: 1935-38, File II, memorandum from 
Maconachie to Talks department on 'talks on topics of Jewish interest', 9 December 1938. Rabbi Hertz 
was eventually scheduled to give a broadcast in the Autumn of 1939 but the BBC pulled the plug citing 
scheduling conflicts. Hertz eventually was given a broadcast slot in March 1943 to speak only about the 
Jewish festival of Purim whilst millions of his co-religionists in Europe had already been killed. 
87 BBC WAC R34/789/ l , memorandum from the variety director to the director of entertainment, 11 July 
1935 
88 BBC WAC R34/789/l , memorandum to Siepmann on a Jewish broadcast service for Europe, 11 
Januarv 1939 
89 BBC WAC R34/789/l , memorandum on a proposed concert by contemporary Jewish composers, 17 
September 1937 
90 ibid. . the controller of programmes was Cecil Graves . 
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cause, but more probably the reverse!' 
91 A concurring producer argued that 'owing to 
the uncertain situation [ ... ] regarding both Palestine and World Jewry [ ... ] it would be 
better to postpone this feature at least until the autumn.' 
92 When the program was finally 
approved to be broadcast at the end of 1939, neither 'the rise of Jewish nationalism' nor 
the 'return of Palestine under the terms of the Balfour Declaration' were to be discussed . 
93 A similar retreat from controversial content saw the Corporation replace the respected 
Jewish academic, Ernst Toller, as a panelist on the topic of 'Freedom' with one who 'left 
Germany voluntarily because he did not agree with Nazi politics. He is not a Jew.' 
94 Any 
representation of Jews, particularly in a non-entertainment capacity, was usually carefully 
considered among Corporation executives, particularly when the process of appeasement 
presented potential diplomatic complications . 
The Corporation was influenced strongly by the pressure of public opinion and 
while there is little evidence to suggest that the public opposed persecution stories before 
193 8, 95 there was never any organized public pressure placed on the BBC to produce 
more stories about anti-Jewish persecution. The way in which items of news or 
entertainment relating to Jewish matters were handled and interpreted also suggests that 
those within the Corporation viewed these issues much in the same way as did the public . 
When the Jewish community made the rare attempt to press for more Jewish 
programming, the issue would quickly be termed a 'Jewish problem' and some producers 
would express the 'nuisance to have to bother about the Jews.' 
96 One Jewish artist, Esta 
Stein, who performed with the Yiddishe Suave Choir wrote to Bruce Belfrage of the 
Variety department in May 1938: 'There is some very fine humour in Jewish life that 
would brighten the lives of our persecuted race if it would be given on the air.' Belfrage 
responded: 'At the moment there does not appear to be an immediate demand for the type 
91 BBC WAC R34/789/l File 2, memorandum on the proposal for a series entitled 'The History of the 
Jews in Britain' , 8 August 1938 
92 ibid. , 16 March 1939 
93 BBC WAC Reverend J.W. Parkes Contributor File, 1938-41, File I, internal 'talks' memorandum, 20 
February 1939 
94 BBC WAC R5 l/187 Talks: Freedom 1935-36, memorandum on the suggestion of speakers for the 
series, 19 February 1935. Also referred to in Scannell and Cardiff, p. 159. 
95 Briggs, vol. II, p. 136 
96 BBC WAC, R34/952/5643 , undated memo by talks producer Trevor Bl«ewitt on Jewish programming 
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of show you specialise in.' 97 Stein, it was noted, 'is inclined to be a bit [BBC underline] 
of a nuisance.' 98 When BBC producers felt compelled to appease those members of the 
Jewish community calling for more programs of this 'type', the decided ' solution to this 
Jewish problem' would be to air the odd feature on regional broadcasts. 
99 After one 
request, the director of variety wrote: 'I understood it to be our policy to give [ .. . ] the 
freedom of the microphone at certain stated and rather rare intervals, to certain 
professional companies who cater for Jewish audiences.' 
100 
Programs calling for discussion on the issue of tolerance or wide-ranging features 
on Jews, in addition, were usually met with hostility from BBC producers. After the 
events of Kristallnacht in 193 8, which the BBC covered in one, brief news bulletin, one 
listener called on the BBC to produce a talk on the history of Jews in England. 
101 By 
dealing with the subject of Jews in a positive way, unrelated to the events in Germany, the 
indirect effects might be to promote mutual understanding between Jews and non-Jews, he 
argued. During a time when the Jewish crisis was exposed at every level, the BBC 
believed that there was not a sufficient audience to whom the programs would appeal, and 
that it might present a problem in light of the political circumstances. ' Another call for a 
programme on Jewish life. I think it's really to do with Palestine again ·and should be 
refused tactfully,' wrote one producer. 
102 Sidney Salomon of the Board of Deputies tried 
in vain to urge the Corporation to run a program on the subject of tolerance and the 'evils 
of persecution' in 1938. 
103 Saloman's request was ignored and by the time war broke 
out, the Corporation was to include no such issues among its talks . 
97 BBC WAC Esta Stein File I, 1936-62, first letter: Stein to Belfrage on a proposal for a Jewish humor 
sketch. 11 May 1938. second letter: Belfrage to Stein rejecting her request, 13 January 1939 
98 BBC WAC Esta Stein File, Risk of the Entertainment department on Stein, 22 September 1937 
99 BBC WAC R34/789/l , memorandum from CA Siepmann on Esta Stein, 8 June 1936 
100 ibid. , director of variety to controller of programmes, 12 October 1937 
101 BBC WAC R34/789/II 1938-43, A.M. Hyamson to Maconachie, 21 December 1938 
102 cited in Seaton, p. 60 
103 BBC WAC R34/789/II 1938-43, Saloman to Brewer, 30 October 1938 
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V. Entertainment and criticism · 
The Variety department spent a considerable time weighing the importance of 
Jewish programming in the second half of the 1930s. Until this time, Jews were often 
featured as caricatures, parodies of the 'East End' stereotype. The Jewish community and 
the Anglo-Jewish press were not unmoved by the Corporation's seeming reluctance to 
gear any ofits programs toward a Jewish audience. In one Jewish daily, the author wrote: 
There seems to be some definite objection on the part of the BBC to the inclusion 
of Jewish items in their broadcasts. We are repeatedly approached on the subject 
by some of our readers, and the attitude of the BBC in all suggestions of this 
nature that are made to them seems surprising [ ... ] We do not grudge the BBC in 
its efforts to be amusing by putting up jokes or rhymes at the expense of the Jews, 
even though they are mostly silly, if not vulgar and banal, or songs crooned into 
the air with a foreign supposedly Jewish accent. Surely if time is found for this, 
time could also be found for a few genuine Jewish folk-songs, Jewish music, or a 
Jewish choir. Local talent has been rejected just as famous foreign Jewish artists 
have been turned down. We do not wish to be misunderstood. Certainly the BBC 
would not tum down Jascha Heifetz, Mischa Elman, Yehudi Menuhin, 
Moiseiwitsch or Harriet Cohen, because they are Jews. 
104 
The BBC wondered whether it should make 'any special effort to meet this [Jewish] 
criticism.' 105 An internal (and informal) inquiry in 1935 into the introduction of Jewish 
programming, prompted by the criticism raised in the Anglo-Jewish press, concluded that 
'no special effort should be made about Jewish material '. 
106 No example of 'strictly 
Jewish' material could be cited and the consensus among executives within the Variety 
department was that 'purely Jewish stuff is not of radio material. ' 
107 The variety director 
argued that 'most of their [the Jews] material is musical and consists of dreary songs 
which [ ... ] have a very depressing effect upon the non-Jewish audience.' 
108 The director 
of drama argued, 'I see no object in digging about for obscure Jewish dramatic material 
104 BBC WAC, R34/789/l , clipping from the Jewish Daily Post, 'Broadcasts in Yiddish ', 5 July 1935 
105 ibid. , handwritten note on memo on Jewish broadcasts, 16 July 1935 . 
106 BBC WAC R34/789/l file I, memorandum from director of international programmes to the director of 
entertainment, 23 July 1935 
107 ibid., handwritten written note by Roger H. Eckersley, director of entertainment, on memorandum on 
Jewish broadcasts, 16 July 1935 
108 BBC WAC R34/789/l file I, memorandum from variety director to the director of entertainment, 11 
July 1935 
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simply because it is Jewish'. 109 After 1935, the Corporation agam would consider 
featuring 'Jewish' programming and as discussed below, the Variety department 
eventually went ahead with one feature, although not without criticism . 
Variety and entertainment programs which featured participants of Jewish descent 
were often considered 'Jewish' programming by the Variety department executives. 
110 
§ 
Any dramatic representations of Jews on the air, in addition, were interpreted through the 
minds of non-Jewish producers and writers. When Jewish entertainers were featured on 
the air, their acts often consisted of material offensive to the Jewish community. The 
Board of Deputies and the BBC corresponded on these very matters. 'What we [ ... ] 
resent,' protested Sidney Saloman after one offending broadcast, 'is the presentation in 
which all the characters speak with a whine.' 
111 While the Board neither encouraged nor 
discouraged Jewish programming, it was keen to express dissatisfaction with the 
promotion ofJewish stereotypes over the airwaves. Between 1936 and 1937, the Variety 
department made an effort to produce two entertainment programs which might appeal 
specifically to a Jewish audience. The department's first attempt to produce a 'Jewish' 
program, however, came under heavy fire from the community and as a result, subsequent 
Jewish programs were dropped. This light feature, entitled 'Almonds and Raisins' had 
'aroused a considerable amount of resentment, conveying as it [did] a completely false 
impression of Jewish custom and ceremonial,' the Board protested. 
112 People who were 
meant to represent Jews spoke with contrived accents and the holiest Jewish prayer, the 
Kol Nidre, was sung in a mocking tone. 'The ordinary Englishman of the Jewish 
persuasion speaks English like his neighbor does,' wrote Sidney Saloman of the Board. 
113 
Another response from a member of the Jewish community argued: 'This type of 
109 BBC WAC R34/789/1 , memorandum on Jewish broadcasts from the director of drama to the director 
of entertainment, 16 July 1935 
11° Kenneth Wright of the Entertainment department wrote in a memo to the director of entertainment: ' In 
a general way, music and artists being accepted and broadcast on their merits, the "Jewish" element in 
musical programmes is high. ' ibid. , 7 November 1935 
§ the Variety department oversaw the Entertainment department. 
111 BBC WAC R34/789/l , Saloman to Charles Brewer of the programmes department, 21 January 1938 
11 2 ibid., letter from A. G. Brotman of the Board of Deputies to Sir Stephen Tallents on the program 
'Almonds and Raisins', 22 July 193 7 
11 3 ibid., letter from Sidney Saloman of the Board of Deputies to Charles Brewer in the programmes 
department on a recent variety program, 5 October 1937 
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programme is not representative of modem Jewish music, of Jewish life, or of the modem 
Jew.' 114 'I have assumed that the Jewish public like these programmes,' wrote one 
dumbfounded producer. 1
15 A brief inquiry into the entertainment feature found that 
comparatively, 'there is strict censorship on our own Gentile [music hall] scripts to keep 
out anything that has a biblical reference.' 
116 When the Board, who were briefly 
considered to serve as an unofficial advisory body on 'Jewish' content, finally expressed 
its opposition to any Jewish programming whose content was not of a high quality, the 
Corporation chose simply to remove all Jewish programs from the air. 'If the programmes 
broadcast do not please the Jewish audiences, I can see no possible excuse for continuing, 
as the programmes themselves, as they stand, regarded as entertaining for a wider public, 
are definitely no good,' wrote the director of variety after receiving complaints. 'This is 
rather enlightening,' wrote another BBC executive in reference to the Board's decision 
' and helps us to take a strong line as to the standard of material without feeling that we 
need to make any undue effort to put on a programme at any cost for Jewish listeners.' 
117 
11 4 BBC WAC R34/789/I, Joseph Cohen, a Cambridge economics lecturer, to the BBC, 5 October 1937 
115 ibid., director of variety to Cecil Graves, controller of programmes, 12 October 1937 
11 6 BBC WAC R34/789/l , director of variety to controller of programmes, 25 October 1937 
117 ibid. , undated memo of 193 7 in reference to a Board of Deputies letter 
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In a recent collection of his essays, Eric Hobsbawm attacks the historiographical 
trend of 'counterfactual' history. He writes: 'Arguments about counterfactual alternatives 
cannot be settled since evidence is about what happened and hypothetical situations did 
not happen. They belong to politics or ideology, but not to history.' 
1 I note Hobsbawm's 
remarks because it is particularly relevant to work on the Holocaust and Nazism. The 
most natural question that might arise from a study of bystanders (like this one) is 'what 
impact would it have had, had things turned out differently?' Before I discuss the 
implications of this question, let us return to the arguments presented in this study. The 
BBC was designed to serve as an independent, state-funded broadcast institution. From 
its incorporation in 1927, it pursued a cautious approach to 'political' news. In 1933, 
when the Nazi regime came to power in Germany, the Talks department of the BBC was 
in its most 'experimental' stage choosing to chronicle the new regime in a relatively 
critical manner. When Richard Crossman reported on the anti-SA purge in 1934, the 
Foreign Office lodged a protest believing it to have been too 'pro-Nazi' in tone. As a 
result of this complaint, and at the suggestion of John Reith, the BBC developed an 
informal broadcast agreement with the Foreign Office. From this point forward, the BBC 
was to clear all manuscript talks dealing with foreign or political affairs with the Foreign 
Office. The Foreign Office, in tum, could make suggestions on how to change the content 
of talks if they were deemed 'sensitive' . The BBC was not only willing to cooperate with 
these suggestions but eager to 'pre-empt' any complaints by the Foreign Office. This 
approach contributed to the control of news content that was perhaps more cautious than 
that of the Foreign Office. By 1936, when the diplomatic aims of the Foreign Office 
became the pursuit of appeasement, the BBC shifted its broadcast policy ( on an ad hoe 
basis) so as not to broadcast news excessively critical of Nazi Germany. Because 
'negative' news about Germany was carefully controlled by the BBC, it contributed 
partially to a culture where full information about the anti-Jewish persecution was not 
broadcast. This is, however, only a partial explanation because the issue of broadcasting 
anti-Jewish persecution was never a contentious one between the two organizations . 
News of the anti-Jewish persecution was never seen as a broadcast priority by the BBC . 
1 Eric Hobsbawm, On History (London, 1997), 232 
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The socio-cultural phenomenon of latent anti-Semitism in Britain, exemplified by the 
policy of the BBC, unconsciously regulated news output about anti-Jewish persecution. It 
was both misrepresented and misinterpreted because it never emerged as an issue worthy 
of further, critical analysis . 
So what does this tell us? What would have happened had the BBC treated this 
information in a more detailed and critical manner? Who would have benefited? Could 
the Corporation have helped to change the attitude people had about Jews in Britain? 
Could the Corporation have impacted Britain's refugee/Palestine policy? Did the BBC 
betray it journalistic responsibility to 'tell the whole story'? All of these questions present 
an elusive task for the historian. It is difficult to ignore them. To do so would be wrong . 
To answer them with assuredness, irresponsible. Hobsbawm warns against this trend 
precisely because it is tempting. The telling of history provides facts. Speculative history 
provides variables. It is very unlikely that the BBC's actions would have benefited many 
people had they broadcast fuller accounts of anti-Jewish persecution. The social and 
cultural conditions of 1930s Britain were not ripe to address and to respond to anti-Jewish 
persecution on a mass scale. The BBC never 'betrayed' its responsibility to 'tell the whole 
story' about anti-Jewish persecution because it was always an unconscious process. The 
tragedy of the Corporation's approach to this issue was its outright ambivalence. The 
only conscious 'betrayal' carried out by the BBC related to its muted coverage of German 
news unrelated to persecution. In this lay what John Coatman, director of the BBC North 
Region, referred to as a 'conspiracy of silence' . In a 193 8 memorandum, Coatman wrote 
about the BBC's failure to fully inform the public about the issues leading up to the 
Munich negotiations: 
In the past we have not played the part which our duty to the people of this 
country called upon us to play. We have, in fact, taken part in a conspiracy of 
silence. I am not saying for a moment that we did this willingly or even knowingly 
[ .. . ] In view of our history and our peculiar relationship to the Government, and 
also the very short time, comparatively speaking, during which we have been at 
work, I think even the sternest critic can hardly have expected us to have behaved 
differently. But now things have changed. The position of this country is infinitely 
more dangerous than it has ever been in modern times, and the past few weeks 
have invested the BBC with a new importance, given it a more vital role in the 
national life, and have, therefore, laid a new responsibility on us who are its 
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servants. This responsibility is to let the people of this country know[ ... ] just what 
is happening. 2 
Coatman's observation leads to the next point. Exactly how does this study relate 
to the work carried out on the BBC and its coverage of the Holocaust? The policies of 
pre-war Nazi Germany provided a context for the culture in which atrocities would be 
carried out. There is little doubt, in my mind, that industrialized genocide was not the plan 
of the Nazis between 1933 and 1938. Not even the most acute contemporary observer 
could have developed this theory. The context, however, is what the British public never 
fully grasped. In a well-known 1945 account, Richard Dimbleby filed a report on the 
liberation of Bergen-Belsen. The story was not broadcast for over a day until producers 
could check the authenticity of his account. 'When they heard it,' wrote Dimbleby in his 
memoirs, ' some people wondered if [I] had gone off [my] head or something. ' 
3 The 
reaction of BBC producers and editors to the death camps, as one recent study has shown, 
was neither an indication of what they did not know or what they had refused to believe all 
along. 4 The mass destruction of European Jewry was an issue which many in the BBC 
simply chose not to think about. It was something which failed to pervade the 
consciousness of these individuals for various reasons. Jean Seaton has argued that the 
anxieties and stresses of war would not allow them to consider deeply the question of 
extermination. For them to do so would be a 'spiritual surrender' to Nazi brutality. 
5 As 
early as May 1941, however, a directive handed down to the European news service called 
for 'straight news items on the systematic destruction of the Jews in limited quantities and 
without humanitarian comment.' 6 In other words, the BBC was not lacking in 
information about the genocide. The social perceptions of Jews and news relating to the 
Jewish community, however, remained largely unchanged from the pre-war era. With few 
exceptions, the framework stayed the same. The BBC placed an emphasis on certain 
issues and left others vague. The British public, moreover, was never ' set-up ' to hear 
2 Scannell and Cardiff, pp. 88-89 
3 Seaton, p. 56 
4 Gabriel Milland, ' A very British kind of censorship: The BBC and the Holocaust' (unpublished essay 
given at the IHR 31 October 1996) 
5 Seaton, p. 68 
6 BBC WAC R34/655 1940-41, directive for 25 May - 31 May 1941 
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about wartime atrocity stories because the events which preceded mass murder were not 
fully developed anyway. It is little wonder that accounts of liberated death camps came as 
a complete shock to the majority of the British people . 
Every morning, at one, BBC Radio 4 surrenders its strong medium-wave signal 
and lends it to the World Service until six, when the shipping forecast is read. The first 
words many listeners around the world hear at the top of the hour remind them that they 
are listening to London. The practice was begun during the Second World War to 
comfort European listeners. Today it is a familiar phrase which is associated with truth 
and fairness . As I wrote in the introduction, the conceptions of truth, of objectivity and 
responsibility are what the BBC means to many listeners around the world. As we have 
seen, it was the foundation on which the Corporation was built. And as we have also 
seen, these ideals were defined and carried out in a much different way during the 1930s . 
I began this discussion by stressing the fact that this is not intended to be a moral critique 
of the Reithian BBC. The BBC of the 1930s is an historical relic, and the evidence 
presented hitherto suggests that we cannot know how individuals inside Broadcasting 
House felt toward the coverage of the anti-Jewish persecution, if indeed, they considered 
the question at all. According to the available evidence, there was no 'question' to 
consider. 
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